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GRANTS 
W. Nicholson Price II† 
ABSTRACT 
Innovation is a primary source of economic growth and is accordingly the target of 
substantial academic and government attention. Grants are a key tool in the government’s 
arsenal to promote innovation, but legal academic studies of that arsenal have given them 
short shrift. Although patents, prizes, and regulator-enforced exclusivity are each the subject 
of substantial literature, grants are typically addressed briefly, if at all. According to the 
conventional story, grants may be the only feasible tool to drive basic research, as opposed to 
applied research, but they are a blunt tool for that task. 
Three critiques of grants underlie this narrative: grants are allocated by government 
bureaucrats who lack much of the relevant information for optimal decision-making; grants 
are purely ex ante funding mechanisms and therefore lack accountability; and grants 
misallocate risk by saddling the government all the downside risk and giving the innovator all 
the upside. These critiques are largely wrong. Focusing on grants awarded by the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), the largest public funder of biomedical research, this Article delves 
deeply into how grants actually work. It shows that—at least at the NIH—grants are awarded 
not by uninformed bureaucrats, but by panels of knowledgeable peer scientists with the benefit 
of extensive disclosures from applicants. It finds that grants provide accountability through 
repeated interactions over time. And it argues that the upside of grant-investments to the 
government is much greater than the lack of direct profits would suggest. 
Grants also have two marked comparative strengths as innovation levers: they can 
support innovation where social value exceeds appropriable market value, and they can directly 
support innovation enablers—the people, institutions, processes, and infrastructure that shape 
and generate innovation. Where markets undervalue some socially important innovations, like 
?
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cures for diseases of the poor, grants can help. Grants can also enable innovation by 
supporting its inputs: young or exceptional scientists, new institutions, research networks, and 
large datasets. Taken as a whole, grants do not form a monolithic, blunt innovation lever; 
instead, they provide a varied and nuanced set of policy options. Innovation scholars and 
policymakers should recognize and develop the usefulness of grants in promoting major social 
goals. 
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I.? INTRODUCTION 
Grants play a key role in innovation policy. The federal government spent 
over $64 billion in 2016 in grants to support scientific research.1 That sum is 
vastly more than the government spends on prizes (under $0.1 billion), nearly 
?
 1. Historical Trends in Federal R&D, AM. ASS’N FOR ADVANCEMENT SCI. 
https://www.aaas.org/programs/r-d-budget-and-policy/historical-trends-federal-rd 
[https://perma.cc/3P22-A45C] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019). 
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an order of magnitude greater than what it spends on research and 
development tax credits (about $10 billion), and comparable to what it spends 
on patents through a shadow tax on consumers (between $30 and $700 billion, 
though difficult to estimate).2 Grants are especially prominent in the life 
sciences. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is the world’s largest public 
funder of biomedical research.3 Every year, it administers over $29 billion in 
grant funding to over 300,000 researchers in over 2,500 institutions.4 Through 
their scale and ubiquity, grants significantly shape the progress of science and 
innovation. Grants help determine which areas of science are studied and how, 
make or break the careers of academic and non-academic scientists alike, and 
guide the creation of new institutes and discipline-spanning resources. 
So how should the grant system operate? When should we deploy grants 
instead of patents or prizes to drive innovation? Whom should we fund and 
what policies should govern that funding? These questions are not rhetorical: 
2017 saw a high-profile fight between the Trump Administration and Congress 
about science funding levels5 and an intense discussion in the scientific 
community about new NIH grant-funding policies.6 
If these questions addressed changes to patent law, we could draw on an 
extensive literature about how patents shape innovation, what changes would 
have what impacts, and what we should think about when proposing new 
?
 2. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 303, 361, 371 (2013) (defining grants as including both funds directed to external 
researchers and funds spent on direct government research and basing patent expenditures on 
the patent-enabled supra-competitive pricing that constitutes a “shadow tax” on consumers 
of the patented good). 
 3. See Grants & Funding, NIH, https://www.nih.gov/grants-funding 
[https://perma.cc/8BJY-AZ4D] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019). 
 4. See Budget, NIH, https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/budget 
[https://perma.cc/PKP5-4WVZ] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) [hereinafter NIH, Budget]. 
 5. See, e.g., Joel Achenbach & Lena H. Sun, Trump Budget Seeks Huge Cuts to Science and 
Medical Research, Disease Prevention, WASH. POST (May 23, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2017/05/22/trump-budget-
seeks-huge-cuts-to-disease-prevention-and-medical-research-departments/ 
[https://perma.cc/UAY9-28Y5] (noting the early unfavorable reactions to Trump’s proposed 
budget); Robert Pear, Congress Rejects Trump Proposals to Cut Health Research Funds, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/us/politics/national-institutes-of-
health-budget-trump.html [https://perma.cc/KA32-BCY3] (noting that Congress rejected 
Trump’s proposed budget and introduced a bipartisan bill to increase spending). 
 6. See, e.g., Develop Your Budget, NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/how-to-apply-
application-guide/format-and-write/develop-your-budget.htm [https://perma.cc/6B4P-
EFPK] (last visited Oct. 31, 2018) (providing instructions to create a budget and noting that 
there are “spending caps on certain expenses” in addition to salary caps); Sara Reardon, NIH 
Announces Grant Limits, 545 NATURE 142 (2017) (discussing the concerns of the scientific 
community in response to the NIH’s new budget policy). 
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policies.7 If these questions considered the structure or funding of prizes for 
achieving innovation goals, we could reach for another extensive literature 
tackling similar issues.8 And if we wished to debate the relative merits of 
patents, prizes, pure market allocation, government procurement, tax subsidies 
for research-and-development, and grants, a substantial volume of scholarship 
addresses such comparative issues.9 But the grant system itself? That occupies 
a much emptier shelf in the library of innovation law.10 
In the uncommon instances where grants appear in this literature, they 
appear in comparative work evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of 
different policy mechanisms for promoting innovation. In this context, a 
consistent argument holds that grants suffer from an information disadvantage 
relative to patents, and, to a lesser extent, prizes and tax incentives, because 
they do not effectively aggregate private information.11 A closely related point 
is that grants are particularly useful at funding basic research—that is, early-
?
 7. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent 
Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 
20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power 
Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 
97 MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999); Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the 
Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255 (2009); 
John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505 (2010); Craig A. Nard & 
John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619 (2007); 
Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications 
for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010); Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent 
Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672 (2014). 
 8. See Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 999, 1003–05 (2014) (noting that “the past two decades have seen a virtual explosion 
of scholarship on prize systems, particularly within the economic and legal literatures on 
intellectual property, but also in political philosophy and public health” and providing 
extensive citations).  
 9. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 2, at 305 (“In recent years, articles comparing the 
relative merits of patents, prizes, and grants have consumed thousands of pages in law reviews 
and economics journals.”) (citing Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property 
Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1473, 1530–34 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (reviewing recent literature)). 
 10. See, e.g., Laura Pedraza-Fariña, The Social Origins of Innovation Failures, 70 SMU L. REV. 
377, 443 (2017) (“Legal scholarship on intellectual property and innovation law more broadly 
has paid comparatively little attention to how to design grants and prizes to foster innovation, 
and how grant-making interacts with other innovation policies—and patents in particular.”). 
 11. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 
11–14 (1969). This argument applies with equal force to other exclusivity-based incentive 
mechanisms, such as trade secrecy or regulatory exclusivity, since all exclusivity mechanisms 
rely on allowing the innovator to charge supra-competitive prices to capture a greater portion 
of the social welfare benefits of an innovation.  
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stage research without immediate commercial applications—because firms 
tend to undervalue basic research, which has substantial positive knowledge 
externalities.12 
Within the innovation law literature’s relatively sparse descriptions of 
grants, three critiques recur—sometimes as explicit critiques, sometimes as 
assumptions, sometimes as characterizations—about flaws in the grant system. 
To be clear, not all scholars writing about grants raise all these critiques, or 
make them uncritically. In this literature, grants are undertheorized, which is 
both the point and the challenge. I reviewed closely the existing, brief 
discussions of grants in the law-and-innovation literature, and common 
threads emerged. 
Part II describes these critiques. First, grants are allocated by government 
bureaucrats who lack the market-value knowledge possessed by private firms 
and therefore make suboptimal decisions about allocating funding to 
projects.13 Second, because grants provide non-contingent ex ante funding, 
they lack accountability and thus cannot ensure efficient and hard work by 
innovators.14 And third, grants allocate risk suboptimally: the grantor takes 
essentially all of the downside risk of the project (if the innovation fails, the 
government is still out the money with nothing to show for it) and receives 
little of the upside benefit (if the project succeeds, the innovator licenses or 
commercializes the innovation, while the government misses out on the profits 
and may even end up paying high prices for the innovation).15 Taken together, 
these critiques lead to the conclusion that while grants may be an adequate, if 
rather blunt, tool to drive basic research for which other innovation levers are 
unhelpful, those other levers are often preferable when available. Jonathan 
Adler, for instance, actively critiques the grant system on these grounds, 
concluding that “the federal government should shift a substantial portion of 
climate-related research and development funding from grants to prizes.”16 I 
suspect that these critiques are also responsible for the relative dearth of 
scholarship examining grants in depth. If grants are generally viewed as good 
for basic research but flawed relative to other incentive levers, why spend 
much time thinking about them?17 
?
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Section II.A. 
 14. See infra Section II.B. 
 15. See infra Section II.C. 
 16. Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate 
Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011); see infra Part II. 
 17. There are other potential explanations. Laura Pedraza-Fariña and Stephanie Bair, for 
example, argue that legal scholars of innovation have focused on solving the free-rider 
problem to the exclusion of other innovation challenges. See Stephanie Bair & Laura Pedraza-
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The reality of the current grant system belies these three critiques. Part III 
describes the grant system as it functions today, with substantial emphasis on 
grants awarded by the NIH—perhaps the world’s most prominent grant 
funder—to researchers at other institutions, and rebuts each critique.18 First, 
the mechanics of grant application, review, and funding refute the narrative 
that grants are allocated by information-poor bureaucrats. The grant system 
uses a rigorous process of peer review to determine which proposals will be 
funded. Part of this process involves detailed applications, which requires 
potential grant recipients to share their own private information about the 
likely costs and potential value of the proposed research. The evaluation itself 
leverages the expertise of scientists with relevant experience and knowledge. 
And the entire process is coordinated by agency representatives who combine 
their own scientific background with knowledge about the innovation 
priorities of the NIH and the government more generally. 
Second, grantees are in fact accountable for grant-funded research. Each 
grant operates within a context of ongoing funding streams, reporting 
obligations, and repeat players. Even though any individual grant may lack its 
own strong accountability mechanisms, the practical need to get the next grant 
creates accountability for grant recipients.19 
Third, the government gets more out of grants than the risk-allocation 
critique implies. It’s true that the government does not usually profit directly 
from grant-funded innovations, whether they succeed or fail. But the 
government realizes a wide range of social benefits from innovation efforts, 
including the creation of negative knowledge, the generation of innovation 
structures, and the development of human capital. 
Mistaken assumptions or inaccurate critiques change the relative 
desirability of grants as a substitute for other innovation levers when those 
levers fail. Consider patentable subject matter. Between 2012 and 2014, the 
Supreme Court held unpatentable a broad swath of inventions that could be 
?
Fariña, Anti-Innovation Norms, 112 NW. L. REV. 1069, 1076–78 (2018); see also Joshua D. Sarnoff, 
Government Choices in Innovation Funding (with Reference to Climate Change), 62 EMORY L.J. 1087, 
1100 (2013) (similarly lamenting the narrow focus of legal-academic literature). Because grants 
do not address free-rider critiques directly, they may be of less interest to legal scholars with 
that focus. 
 18. I argue that basic lessons from the NIH are generalizable, see infra note 203 and 
accompanying text, but even to the extent they are not, understanding the workings of the 
world’s largest public funder of biomedical research provides useful insight. See NIH, supra 
note 3. 
 19. The ongoing grant cycle has other benefits. For instance, the ongoing need to seek 
future grants impels grant recipients to generate publications that disclose results of funded 
work.  
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characterized as “laws of nature, natural phenomena, [or] abstract ideas.”20 
These decisions prompted scholarly outcry: among other issues, what 
incentives would remain for inventions that subject to this characterization, 
like medical diagnostic methods or human genetic tests?21 In fact, the Court 
raised exactly this question at oral argument.22 As it turns out, many medical 
diagnostics and human genetic tests have been developed in large part by 
grant-funded researchers. Rather than worrying about decreased patent 
incentives, perhaps Congress should increase grant funding for these 
inventions instead.23 If we think grants are fundamentally flawed innovation 
levers, they are less likely to seem like good substitutes when other levers fail. 
If, on the contrary, we are to use grants appropriately as a part of the 
innovation toolbox, we should know how they really work: when they are 
preferable substitutes, when they work poorly, and when they work best in 
concert with other innovation incentives.24 
Part IV describes the rich tools the grant system supplies to policymakers, 
focusing on grants’ two key comparative advantages. First, grants can support 
innovations whose social value exceeds their appropriable market value. This 
describes basic research; because later applications of basic research are 
variable and unpredictable, it has substantial spillovers (positive knowledge 
externalities), and is undersupplied by private firms relative to its social 
benefit.25 Private firms also generate inadequate information about which basic 
research is worth funding. But a panel of experienced peer reviewers, 
?
 20. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 66 (2012) (citing 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 
134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). 
 21. See Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of Personalized Medicine, 
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881, 1907–13 (2016) (discussing the difficulties of obtaining patents 
in diagnostic methods); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 256, 264–78 (2015) (discussing how diagnostic methods have been categorized as 
“natural laws” rather than “applications”).  
 22. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation Incentives, 
5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1115, 1116–17 (2015) (citing Justice Sotomayor’s questions during oral 
argument of Myriad and Mayo). 
 23. See id. at 1137–41 (discussing other incentives that can take the place of absent patent 
incentives). 
 24. No innovation lever stands on its own; an innovation may be grant-funded in early 
phases, patented shortly thereafter, developed using secret processes and relying on tax-
incentives, and even win a prize at the end. See, e.g., Pierre Azoulay et al., Public R&D Investments 
and Private-sector Patenting: Evidence from NIH Funding Rules, 86 REV. ECON. STUD. 117, 140 (2019) 
(finding that a $10 million boost in NIH funding leads to around 2.5 additional patents). 
 25. See generally Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. POL. 
ECON. 297, 302–04 (1959). 
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combined with disclosures from grant-seeking researchers, may be able to 
make precisely that determination. At a broader level, the market systematically 
undervalues some forms of innovation because market demand does not 
reflect social welfare value. A powerful example is innovation targeting 
diseases of the poor; because the poor often cannot pay for drugs, market 
signals do not reflect the social welfare benefits of developing those drugs. The 
grant system’s reliance on non-price signals brings risks of inefficiency or 
cronyism, but its incorporation of non-market information also allows 
different, useful allocation of funds beyond what markets would pick. 
Second, grants can directly support innovation enablers—the people, 
institutions, processes, and infrastructural resources involved in innovation—
in a way largely unavailable to other forms of directed innovation incentives, 
especially patents and prizes. Basic research serves this role when it provides 
the grounding for later research, but it is only one example. Grants can develop 
human capital by providing training or otherwise enabling the research of 
young scientists who will have longer careers ahead of them. Grants can also 
target the processes or institutions of innovation by providing resources 
specifically for interdisciplinary research (to build collaborations and 
boundary-crossing networks) or for institutions (to provide physical or other 
resources for collections of individuals). Finally, they can support 
infrastructure, including datasets that enable future innovation, such as the 
Precision Medicine Initiative’s All of Us dataset or the Human Genome 
Project (both NIH-funded). 
When policymakers can leverage the grant system’s strengths, grants can 
be an effective innovation lever. But the inverse is also true. In situations where 
private, market-based information accurately reflects the social value of an 
innovation, grants are probably not the best lever to drive that innovation 
because that private information can lead to an efficient allocation of 
innovative activity among firms and innovation targets. 
This Article argues that the dominant picture of scientific grants in the 
innovation literature—the picture of a relatively straightforward and flawed 
tool mostly good for basic research—is far too simple. Grants form their own 
complex, massive set of innovation tools, with their own comparative 
strengths, and are a far larger, better, and more varied part of the innovation 
system than the innovation law literature has recognized. 
II.? GRANTS IN THE INNOVATION LAW LITERATURE  
Grants are undertheorized in the legal innovation literature. Where they 
appear, it is principally as part of a comparison with other sorts of innovation 
incentives, though even those comparisons tend to focus on patents and 
10 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:1 
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prizes, rather than grants.26 Daniel Hemel and Lisa Ouellette, for instance, 
compare the innovation incentives of patents, prizes, grants, and tax R&D 
incentives.27 They group incentives along three axes—who decides what 
innovation will be funded, who pays for the innovation, and when is the 
innovation funded—and conclude that each incentive is useful at different 
times.28 Grants, they suggest, are most effective when the government is 
especially good at identifying costs and benefits and when social benefits 
exceed market signals of value—one of the two key strengths I describe here.29 
They also note an important timing feature of grants: ex ante funding can 
enable otherwise capital-constrained entities to innovate.30 Joshua Sarnoff, 
Brett Frischmann, and Jonathan Adler have also considered grants in 
comparisons of innovation levers.31 Characterizations of grants as an 
innovation incentive, whether comparative or otherwise, have tended to 
emphasize the information disadvantage faced by the grant system, but also 
the positive role of grants in funding basic research. 
The basic information-asymmetry story proceeds as follows. Innovators 
determine whether to invest in a particular innovation based on their private 
?
 26. Compare Roin, supra note 8, at 1001–06 (providing approximately 4 pages worth of 
citations on prizes versus the patent system), with Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 2, at 320–21 
(citing, in a prominent and thorough taxonomy of innovation incentives, only one unpublished 
manuscript and one law review article partially focused on grants). Camilla Hrdy has briefly 
addressed grants in the context of analyzing federal versus state and local incentives for 
innovation. See Camilla Hrdy, Patent Nationally, Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 
1357–63 (2016) [hereinafter Hrdy, Patent Nationally] (discussing federal financing for 
innovation, including grants, and arguing that such funding is limited to research with national 
benefits); see also Camilla Hrdy, Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 52–53 (2015) 
[hereinafter Hrdy, Commercialization Awards] (discussing Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) awards granted by federal research agencies like NIH). 
 27. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 2, at 310–15. 
 28. See id. at 326–52. 
 29. See id. at 375–76. These two features are both involved in the grant system’s ability 
to use different information than markets, described in Part IV. 
 30. Id. at 334–38. 
 31. See Sarnoff, supra note 17, at 1089–90 (considering a broad range of potential 
incentives in the climate-change context and noting the lack of empirical information on grant 
functioning); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Likely Mismatch Between Federal Research & Development 
Funding and Desired Innovation, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 363, 372 (2016) (lamenting the 
focus of innovation law scholarship on intellectual property and market solutions to 
innovation) [hereinafter Sarnoff, Likely Mismatch]; Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: 
Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 352–53, 356, 
389–90 (1999) (noting that grants are useful for the production of public goods but tax 
incentives are preferable in other situations); Adler, supra note 16, at 3–4 (comparing grants 
and prizes in the context of climate change technology and concluding that prizes are generally 
superior). 
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estimations of the cost of innovating and the innovation’s market value.32 Non-
grant mechanisms alter this private-information-based calculus: patents allow 
firms to capture a larger fraction of the expected value of the innovation,33 
prizes typically set a known reward against the privately-estimated cost of 
innovating,34 and tax incentives directly defray the cost of innovating.35 Grants, 
on the other hand, provide ex ante funds to pay innovation costs directly and 
do not leverage private estimations of market value. 
In 1983, Brian Wright showed formally that for patents to be superior to 
other innovation incentives, private firms must have more information than 
government funders.36 Scholars tend to agree that private firms have such an 
information advantage.37 Suzanne Scotchmer and Nancy Gallini, for instance, 
built on Wright’s analysis and noted that grants are poor aggregators of private 
information.38 
However, scholars have also long agreed that grants are important for 
funding basic research, though this agreement is grounded in the economics 
literature rather than the legal literature.39 Basic research is aimed at increasing 
our scientific understanding of the world rather than focusing on useful 
products. In 1959, Richard Nelson noted that basic research has potential 
innovation benefits across a wide range of outputs and is often highly risky.40 
As a result, private industry tends to invest in basic research at socially 
suboptimal levels.41 Kenneth Arrow reiterated this argument in 1962 and 
suggested that government funding of innovation helps resolve the problem, 
though such funding raises questions of how much to spend and how to 
?
 32. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 2, at 326–27. 
 33. See id. at 327–28. 
 34. See id. at 327. 
 35. See id. at 328. 
 36. See Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research 
Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 691 (1983). Among other things, Wright deliberately omits 
the possibility that the modeled innovation would provide information useful for future 
innovations and therefore of independent social value. See id. at 692 n.1. 
 37. See, e.g., Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 9, at 327 (“Patents’ ability to take advantage 
of private information is well recognized in the innovation-policy literature.”). 
 38. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Innovation 
System?, 2 INNOV. POL’Y & ECON. 51, 54, 55–57 (2002). 
 39. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 1693, 1721 (2008) (noting that grants “are probably the most important component of the 
innovation system, in supporting basic research”); id. at 1724 (claiming general agreement that 
grants are the right incentive for basic research, and that the only debate is about applied 
research). 
 40. See Nelson, supra note 25, at 304. 
 41. See id.  
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allocate it.42 Despite these questions of allocation raised by Arrow, other 
incentive mechanisms, including patents and trade secrecy, are poor drivers of 
the production of basic knowledge, giving grants the comparative advantage.43 
These assessments of grants, especially in comparison with other 
innovation policy levers, frequently incorporate three substantive critiques 
about how grants work. First is reliance on decision-making by government 
bureaucrats who often lack market actors’ superior knowledge; second is the 
loss of accountability and incentives because grants rely on purely ex ante 
funding; and third is problematic risk-allocation because the funder bears the 
entire downside risk of the project and captures little of the upside benefit. 
Some find these critiques essentially dispositive; Jonathan Adler concludes that 
while “[f]ederal funding of science is worthwhile, particularly for basic 
scientific research[,] federal R&D money rarely produces commercially viable 
technologies or dramatic technological innovation.”44 The following Sections 
detail each critique. 
A.? BUREAUCRATIC DECISION-MAKING  
Some criticize the grant system because it puts funding decisions in the 
hands of relatively uninformed government bureaucrats. As Adler puts it, 
“With government research grants . . . a federal agency typically determines the 
goal to be achieved, the means to achieve that goal, and who will receive 
funding to pursue it.”45 Frischmann agrees: “[T]he selection process for grants 
relies on the government’s ability to assess the desirability of a project when 
compared with an array of others . . . .”46 Lobbying groups have sometimes 
seized on this complaint; the director of the Traditional Values Coalition 
described NIH funding as “nameless, faceless bureaucrats doling out money 
?
 42. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE 
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 619, 
623 (1962). 
 43. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of 
Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1905–06 (2013) (noting the challenge of appropriating the benefits 
of basic knowledge); Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 256 (noting the inability of patents to claim 
basic biomedical knowledge used in diagnostics under current law); Peter Lee, Social Innovation, 
92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 24–42 (2014) (describing limitations of patents in creating incentives 
for social innovation); id. at 47–52 (describing how government grants might help create such 
incentives). 
 44. Adler, supra note 16, at 30. 
 45. Id. at 14. 
 46. Frischmann, supra note 31, at 353; see Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 2, at 307 (“For 
grants . . . the government tailors the reward on a project-by-project or discovery-by-discovery 
basis.”). 
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like a federal ATM . . . .”47 
This critique can involve concerns of either inadequate information or 
cronyism. First, the government lacks information, at least relative to firms. 
Firms may have private knowledge about both the general costs and benefits 
of a potential innovation (relevant to the choice of which innovation to fund) 
and about their own costs in pursuing that innovation (relevant to the choice 
of which firm should pursue the innovation); the patent system especially 
leverages private knowledge by letting firms decide which innovation to 
pursue.48 Conversely, the government’s lack of this private information likely 
leads to suboptimal choices about what innovation to fund and who should 
undertake it.49 Michael Abramowicz argues specifically in the context of 
orphan drugs that government officials are ill-equipped to distinguish efficient 
from inefficient innovation subsidies.50 Zachary Liscow and Quentin Karpilow 
capture this general concern about information asymmetries when they note 
IP scholars’ deep “skepticism toward the government ‘picking winners’ to 
encourage innovation in some technologies over others.”51 
Second, leaving funding decisions in the hands of bureaucrats may result 
in cronyism, favoritism, and political pressure shaping the process of grant-
funding and scientific progress. Adler argues that historically, patrons of 
?
 47. Rick Weiss, NIH Faces Criticism on Grants, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2003), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/10/30/nih-faces-criticism-on-
grants/504677ed-4c30-498e-b458-c992ecf6c6f4/?utm_term=.df4269595c8d 
[https://perma.cc/65YK-JZRT]. The Coalition’s concerns eventually led to Senate hearings. 
Rick Weiss, Critics of NIH Studies Prompt Senate Hearings, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2004), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/01/19/critics-of-nih-studies-
prompt-senate-hearing/fa9de180-39ab-4dca-8757-34e7dfb80b4e/?utm_term=.4a2e
01a478c7 [https://perma.cc/2UHY-J9KX]. 
 48. See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 38, at 54–55 (explaining that IP has substantial 
benefits if firms have superior knowledge); see also Wright, supra note 36, at 703 (noting that 
patents benefit from “ex ante researcher information relating to the value of the invention”). 
 49. See Adler, supra note 16, at 29 (“Allocating grant money effectively requires the grant-
making entity to pick ‘winners’ and ‘losers,’ something the government has rarely done well.”). 
Frischmann notes:  
[T]he selection process for grants relies on the government’s ability to 
assess the desirability of a project when compared with an array of 
others . . . . If the research is expected to further a commercial end then tax 
incentives may be more effective than grants because final project selection 
is left to the best informed investor, the firm. 
Frischmann, supra note 31, at 353. 
 50. See Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward a New Form of Intellectual 
Property, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1366–67 (2011). 
 51. Zachary D. Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law, 95 
WASH. U. L. REV. 387, 390 n.9 (2017); see also Lee, supra note 43, at 52 (“[G]overnments are 
notoriously poor at ‘picking winners.’ ”). 
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science preferred grants to prizes because grants entailed greater discretion, so 
that patrons could “reward their friends and allies and ensure that only those 
with the right ideas received funding.”52 Cronyism and corruption lead to many 
ills, including inefficiency, decreased trust in government, and lower 
innovation, as only ideas that match the idiosyncratic preferences of the funder 
receive funding. 
B.? UNACCOUNTABLE EX ANTE INCENTIVES  
A second major critique relates to the ex ante nature of grant funding and 
its consequent lack of accountability. Grants provide funds ex ante to 
researchers without conditioning the funds on success.53 Thus, the argument 
goes, grants provide less accountability and lower incentives to researchers to 
work hard and to use resources efficiently.54 Sarnoff laments that “direct 
subsidies may be provided to university professors who fail to produce quality 
research” and thus “over-reward innovation efforts.”55 As Gallini and 
Scotchmer memorably describe it, in one-off grant contexts, “researchers 
might be inclined to ‘take the money and run.’ ”56 Hemel and Ouellette add 
that this unconditionality may cause problems earlier in the process, leaving 
grant-seeking researchers with lower incentives when choosing projects.57 
The researcher, in this critique, has little skin in the game, in striking 
contrast to patents, prizes, or even R&D tax incentives. Under those regimes, 
the researcher must spend her own money to conduct the research or acquire 
funding from private sources with, presumably, strings attached.58 And if she 
?
 52. Adler, supra note 16, at 23 (citing Robin Hanson, Patterns of Patronage: Why Grants 
Won over Prizes in Science 17 (July 28, 1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard 
Law School Library)); see also id. at 29 (“[T]raditional grant funding is more subject to political 
pressure[.]”). 
 53. Indeed, if grants were conditioned on success, they would merely be prizes with 
precedent loans. Grants may condition continued funding on other requirements, such as 
continued reporting, documented expenditures, or something else; these complications will be 
described below. See infra Section III.B.2.a. 
 54. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 42, at 624 (noting this problem and describing potential 
mitigating factors); see also Sarnoff, supra note 17, at 1125. 
 55. Sarnoff, supra note 17, at 1125. 
 56. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 38, at 54 (making and then immediately critiquing 
this critique). 
 57. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 9, at 334 (quoting Rachel Glennerster, Michael 
Kremer & Heidi Williams, Creating Markets for Vaccines, 1 INNOVATIONS: TECH., 
GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 67, 71 (2006)). Of course, the ability of researchers to later 
pursue patents on their innovations results in blending the incentive features of grants and 
patents. 
 58. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 9, at 334–37. As Hemel and Ouellette note, the 
case of tax incentives is slightly more complicated; they create approximately ex ante incentives 
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does not succeed in the research, she gets nothing—patents typically provide 
a route to profit only if a successful product is created, prizes go only to the 
victor, and R&D tax incentives are usually meaningless without underlying 
profits. Thus, she faces incentives to conduct her work efficiently, effectively, 
and successfully to recoup her own expended funds. Grants, in this view, 
provide few incentives in the same vein. 
C.? PROBLEMATIC RISK ALLOCATION 
The third, related critique involves the allocation of risk in grant-funded 
research efforts. Brett Frischmann argues that “when utilizing grants, the 
government, as investor-principal, often bears the entire downside risk of an 
unsuccessful project.”59 Because of the unconditionality of grants, when a 
grant-funded researcher fails to innovate, the funder has no way to recover the 
expended funds. This critique implicitly relies on a private-contracting analogy, 
where the government, as innovation funder, has the same sort of profit-and-
loss incentives as a private party. The reality, as discussed below, is more 
complex.60 
The other half of this critique is that the grantor also receives little of any 
upside benefit of successful innovation. If the government funds 
groundbreaking research that results in a blockbuster drug, the government 
receives none of the profit—and in fact, is instead likely to pay much of that 
drug’s future cost because it pays for a large fraction of health-care costs.61 
Under an older, contrasting model, the federal government retained robust 
rights in research it funded, though it rarely exploited them.62 This model 
largely ended with the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.63 Under Bayh-
Dole, grant recipients keep patent rights to federally funded research, with the 
rationale that these private actors can more effectively act to commercialize 
?
that are available within the same year as the funding, but they require some source of stop-
gap funding such as venture capital or other resources; and if a company fails or has no income, 
tax credits are worthless. See id. at 336–37. These concerns are mitigated by fully refundable 
tax credits, offered by some states. See id. at 337–38. 
 59. Frischmann, supra note 31, at 387 (cited with approval by Sarnoff, supra note 17, at 
1118). 
 60. See infra Section IV.A.1. 
 61. See, e.g., Roin, supra note 8, at 1039–44 (describing government payments for drugs 
through health insurance systems). 
 62. See Danielle Conway-Jones, Research and Development Deliverables under Government 
Contracts, Grants, Cooperative Agreements and CRADAs: University Roles, Government Responsibilities 
and Contractor Rights, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 181, 186–88 (2004) (describing the history of 
federal rights in funded research). 
 63. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended in 
various sections of 35 U.S.C.).  
16 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:1 
?
the nascent technology.64 A vast literature considers the benefits of this move.65 
Notwithstanding whether this transfer of rights to private parties was 
necessary or beneficial on net, the fact remains that because the government 
does not retain rights to funded inventions, it lacks the ability to capture the 
upside of those inventions and often must pay to access them.66 
This complaint about government inability to capture the upside of grant-
funded research appears most forcefully in the public health literature, where 
scholars decry the lack of access to the products of government-funded 
research.67 In the innovation literature, on the contrary, the cost of reduced 
access is often classified as a necessary evil to drive the commercialization 
effort.68 
III.? GRANTS IN PRACTICE (AT THE NATIONAL 
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH)  
This Part describes how grants really work. It begins with a basic overview 
of the grants ecosystem. It then turns to the NIH, and describes in 
?
 64. 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2018); see Conway-Jones, supra note 62, at 188–92 (giving a history 
of technology transfer legislation and executive actions). The Bayh-Dole Act addressed only 
universities and nonprofits. The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. 
L. No. 96480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1701), in a parallel structure, enabled 
government researchers to retain title to patents. And Executive Order 12618 extended the 
Bayh-Dole Act to for-profit corporations. 
 65. For a few places to start, see, for example, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and 
Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 
1663 (1996); Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of 
Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999); F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual 
Property Rights and the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 
(2001); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003); Emily Michiko Morris, The Many Faces of Bayh-Dole, 54 
DUQ. L. REV. 81 (2016); DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL 
INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE 
BAYH-DOLE ACT (2004). 
 66. Under § 202(c)(4) of the Bayh-Dole Act, the federal funding agency shall receive a 
worldwide, nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, fully paid-up license to practice the 
invention on behalf of the United States (or have the invention practiced). However, the Bayh-
Dole Act covers only federally funded research and may not cover other patented inventions 
necessary to practice the innovation. 
 67. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski & Aaron S. Kesselheim, ‘Government Patent Use’: A Legal 
Approach to Reducing Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH AFF. 791 (2016) (describing the problem and 
proposing the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2018) to help address the concern). 
 68. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standard of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 503, 507–15 (2009) (describing the rationale for patents to allow firms to recover the 
high costs of drug discovery); but see, e.g., Glennerster et al., supra note 57, at 68–70, 77 
(describing the desirability of minimizing deadweight loss from drug patents). 
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considerable detail the NIH grant-funding process, organized around the three 
critiques presented in Part I. 
A.? AN OVERVIEW OF GRANTS  
External grants funded by the NIH are the focus of this Article, but some 
initial context is useful. The NIH is not the only funder of grants in the federal 
government, the federal government is not the only funder of grants, and 
grants are not the only way the federal government invests directly in research. 
How do grants work, at a basic level? Typically, the sponsoring agency 
solicits applications for funding (at the NIH, frequently “requests for 
applications,” or RFAs) at a particular level of generality, which can range from 
almost totally open calls for worthy research to very specific calls for proposals 
to address a particular issue.69 Prospective grantees submit applications, which 
typically include information about their qualifications, the research they 
propose to undertake (often including preliminary data), and how much they 
expect it to cost—that is, how they expect to spend the grant funds. The 
grantor decides through some mechanism—much more on this later—which 
of the applications, if any, to fund, and then disburses the money either fully 
prospectively, in tranches, or as reimbursements once research expenses are 
incurred.70 Often, grants come with obligations, which can range from 
acknowledging the funder to committing to make any resulting knowledge 
publicly available.71 
Grants are not the only way the government directly funds innovation.72 
The government may also directly conduct intramural research by employing 
scientists at, for instance, National Laboratories or laboratories at the NIH or 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.73 If the federal government 
relies instead on non-governmental researchers, it uses grants when it wishes 
to fund research but does not “acquire . . . property or services for the direct 
benefit or use of the United States Government” and “substantial 
involvement” of the federal agency is not expected.74 If the government will 
?
 69. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 70. See NIH, NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT IIA-59 (2016) [hereinafter NIH 
GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT]. 
 71. See infra Section III.B.2 (describing disclosure requirements). 
 72. Indirectly, the government funds innovation through several mechanisms already 
mentioned, including R&D tax credits and the enforcement of patent and trade secrecy laws 
(which fund research through ex post “shadow taxes” on users of the patented or secret 
technology). See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 9, at 320–26. 
 73. See Sarnoff, supra note 17, at 1132–36 (describing the role of government agencies in 
promoting research and development). 
 74. 31 U.S.C. § 6304 (2018). 
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acquire goods or services, it uses the procurement system—a $440-billion-
annual-spending behemoth75—instead.76 If the federal agency expects to be 
substantially involved, such as in collaborations between National 
Laboratories and private industry, the agency uses Collaborative Research and 
Development Agreements (CRADAs) to direct the collaboration.77 The 
federal government may also offer prizes, though these remain rare and 
limited.78 While each of these different forms of direct government subsidy is 
substantial and important,79 this Article focuses on federal extramural grants: 
the distribution of funding to innovators outside the government’s walls 
without the expectation of government involvement or government receipt of 
goods or services. Such grants are especially important to university 
researchers.80 
Although federal agencies are the dominant grant funders today, this was 
not always the case and they are not the only source of grant funding. 
Governments at any level, including federal, state, and local, may fund research 
grants.81 Private not-for-profit organizations may also fund research grants.82 
Grants may be funded internally by universities or other research institutes out 
of their own funds.83 Finally, grants may be funded by private industry, a 
funding source that has received increasing attention though it remains 
comparatively small.84 International grant funding is similarly diverse, though 
?
 75. NAT’L CONTRACT MGMT ASS’N, ANNUAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTING 2 (2016).  
 76. See 31 U.S.C. § 6303 (2018); Conway-Jones, supra note 62, at 192-97 (detailing the 
rights and responsibilities of government and contractors in procurement agreements). 
 77. 31 U.S.C. § 6305 (2018). 
 78. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 9, at 317–18. 
 79. See, e.g., Sarnoff, Likely Mismatch, supra note 31, at 375–80 (comparing several direct 
sources of government funding, focusing on direct funding over market regulation like patent 
law). 
 80. Barry Bozeman & Monica Gaughan, Impact of Grants and Contracts on Academic 
Researchers’ Interactions with Industry, 36 RESEARCH POL’Y 694, 694 (2007). 
 81. See, e.g., All CIRM Grants, CAL. INST. REGENERATIVE MED., 
https://www.cirm.ca.gov/grants [https://perma.cc/BC2F-R6ZG] (last visited March 10, 
2019) (listing grants awarded by California’s state-funded stem-cell research agency). For a 
description of how state and local governments provide innovation financing more generally, 
see Hrdy, Patent Nationally, supra note 26, at 1363–75. 
 82. See LILY E. KAY, THE MOLECULAR VISION OF LIFE (1993), passim (describing the 
support provided by the Rockefeller Foundation for the California Institute of Technology 
and its development of the field of molecular biology). 
 83. See, e.g., MCubed, UNIV. MICH., http://mcubed.umich.edu/ [https://perma.cc/
PR8R-ZDUU] (last visited March 10, 2019) (describing the university-funded MCubed grant 
program for intramural research). 
 84. Bozeman & Gaughan, supra note 80, at 694 (“[A]t no time during the history of the 
modern U.S. research university . . . has industry provided as much support for university 
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the relative balance between different governmental levels, not-for-profit, and 
for-profit funding may vary between countries.85 
In the United States, federal research grants have grown tremendously in 
the last half-century.86 In the first half of the twentieth century, private 
foundations provided most extramural funding; the Rockefeller Foundation, 
for instance, was mostly responsible for the early growth of molecular biology 
as a field.87 After World War II, the federal science budget grew tremendously, 
and the government displaced private foundations to become the dominant 
funder of research.88 Today, while the private sector spends more on research 
than the federal government does, it spends mostly within its own walls; the 
federal government remains the dominant source of extramural scientific grant 
funding, especially for basic research.89 
Within the federal government, many agencies fund research through 
grants, including the Department of Defense, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, and the Department of Energy.90 Two agencies especially focus on 
funding basic research: the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the NIH. 
The NSF funds research across many scientific fields, including substantial 
amounts of basic biological research.91 But the largest funder of grant-based 
?
research as any of the top five government funding agencies.”). Private R&D funding as a 
whole is large, but mostly intramural. See id. (noting that industry is the leading source of R&D 
funding nationally). Nonetheless, industry grants have been perceived as having outsized 
importance relative to their size. See id. at 695; see also Mats Benner & Ulf Sandstrom, 
Institutionalizing the Triple Helix: Research Funding and Norms in the Academic System, 29 RES. POL’Y 
291, 293 (2000) (noting how industry funding can change research trajectories). 
 85. An overview of the international grant system is beyond the scope of this Article. 
For a few useful resources, see, e.g., Christoph Grimpe, Extramural Research Grants and Scientists’ 
Funding Strategies: Beggars Cannot be Choosers?, 41 RES. POL’Y 1448, 1450 (2012) (giving an 
overview of the European and German grant systems); SUSAN WRIGHT, MOLECULAR 
POLITICS 32–36, 60–63 (1994) (giving a history of the United Kingdom’s grant-funding system 
in the twentieth century). 
 86. WRIGHT, supra note 85, at 21. 
 87. Id.; see also KAY, supra note 82, passim.  
 88. WRIGHT, supra note 85, at 21. 
 89. See Mike Henry, US R&D Spending at All-Time High, Federal Share Reaches Record Low, 
AM. INST. PHYSICS (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.aip.org/fyi/2016/us-rd-spending-all-time-
high-federal-share-reaches-record-low [https://perma.cc/VJG5-GRLA] (noting that private 
spending reached 69% of total R&D while federal spending dropped to 23%, but also noting 
that the federal government remains the top funder of basic research). 
 90. See Grant-Making Agencies, GRANTS.GOV, https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/
learn-grants/grant-making-agencies.html [https://perma.cc/S8MZ-DN3N] (last visited 
March 10, 2019). 
 91. Richard Freeman & John Van Reenen, What If Congress Doubled R&D Spending on the 
Physical Sciences?, 9 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 1, 6 (2009); Thomas O. McGarity, Peer Review 
in Awarding Federal Grants in the Arts and Sciences, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 15–16. 
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research by far, focusing entirely on biomedical science, is the NIH, “the center 
of a vast research system unmatched in size and scope throughout the 
world.”92 The NIH comprises twenty-seven different Institutes and Centers 
(collectively, “Institutes”), each focused on a “specific disease area, organ 
system, or stage of life”; examples include the National Cancer Institute, the 
National Human Genome Research Institute, and the National Institute on 
Aging.93 Of these, twenty-four make grant awards.94 The NIH expends about 
$37.3 billion in biomedical research per year; 10% of that is spent on its own 
intramural research programs, and around 80% on extramural grants.95 “[I]n 
the market for biomedical research, NIH is the 800 pound gorilla.”96 
B.? TESTING THE THREE CRITIQUES AT THE NIH 
Part II introduced three critiques of the grant system: they rely on 
bureaucratic decision-making; they are largely unaccountable due to ex ante 
funding; and they poorly allocate risk by giving the grantor most of the 
downside risk and little of the upside. These critiques largely fail to reflect the 
reality of the modern grant system, at least as practiced at the NIH. 
Uninformed bureaucrats do not make the principal funding decisions, which 
are instead effectively made by panels of well-informed peer scientists. 
Funding is only ex ante and (mostly) unaccountable for single grants, but 
researchers are repeat players and depend on the next grant as well, creating 
accountability.97 And rather than misallocating downside risk entirely to the 
NIH and the upside entirely to the researcher, the NIH actually sees much 
more upside benefit—and researchers more downside cost. 
1. Bureaucratic Decision-Making 
How are grant decisions made at the NIH?98 In brief: the NIH seeks grant 
applications, peer reviewers evaluate and compare the grant applications 
?
 92. WRIGHT, supra note 85, at 26. 
 93. For a full list of the twenty-seven institutes and centers, see List of NIH Institutes, 
Centers, and Offices, NIH, https://www.nih.gov/institutes-nih/list-nih-institutes-centers-offices 
[https://perma.cc/5TMP-2LTN] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) [hereinafter List of NIH Institutes]. 
 94. Understanding the NIH: Finding the Right Fit for Your Research, NIH, 
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/understanding-nih.htm [https://perma.cc/W5W6-ZGES] 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 95. NIH, Budget, supra note 4. 
 96. Freeman & Van Reenan, supra note 91, at 19. 
 97. As mentioned above, grants do not act in isolation; researchers may also be able to 
patent useful inventions, which provides an additional incentive. However, this Article focuses 
on incentives internal to the grant system.  
 98. See generally Grants Process Overview, NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/
grants_process.htm [https://perma.cc/2VXH-ZYQW] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
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submitted in response, and the NIH makes final funding decisions. In both 
the seeking of grant applications (that is, deciding what areas of innovation to 
fund) and the process of peer review (that is, deciding which innovators and 
projects specifically to fund), the NIH funding process belies the critique that 
grant-funding decisions are made by bureaucrats lacking relevant knowledge. 
This is especially true for the broad, open R01 research project grant 
program.99 As Richard Freeman and John Van Reenen put it: 
At the heart of the American biomedical science enterprise are the 
R01 grants that the NIH gives to fund individual scientists and their 
teams of postdoctorate employees and graduate students. The 
system of funding individual researchers on the basis of unsolicited 
applications for research support comes close enough to 
economists’ views of how a decentralized market mechanism 
operates to suggest that this ought to be an efficient way to conduct 
research compared, say, to some central planner mandating research 
topics. The individual researchers choose the most promising line of 
research on the basis of “local knowledge” of their special field. They 
submit proposals to funding agencies, where panels of experts—
“study sections” in the NIH world—give independent peer review, 
ranking proposals in accordance with criteria set out by funding 
agencies and their perceived quality. Finally, the agency funds as 
many proposals with high rankings that it can within its budget 
constraints.100 
This Section explores the grant-funding process. 
a)? Seeking Grant Applications 
The first step of innovation funding is deciding what areas of innovation 
to fund. Some innovation incentives, like prizes, typically require that the target 
be fully identified beforehand. Others, like patents, require no ex ante 
identification by any administrator; private firms decide what opportunities to 
pursue. Grants might resemble prizes, in that the government identifies 
beforehand what it would like to fund. As we shall see, this is only partially 
true; at the NIH, some grant funding (“solicited” applications) looks like 
broadly-defined prizes, with innovation targets identified up front; other 
funding (“unsolicited” projects) resembles patents, in that the agency is open 
to a very wide range of possible projects. In either form, the NIH announces 
that it will accept applications in a “Funding Opportunity Announcement” 
?
 99. The NIH’s “R” grants provide support for research projects. See Research Grants (R), 
NIH, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/funding/grant-writing-and-application-process/research-
grants-r.shtml [https://perma.cc/3T57-AH6H] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 100. Freeman & Van Reenen, supra note 91, at 18–19. 
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that lays out the parameters for what sorts of grants might be funded.101 
Unsolicited grants allow individual innovators to suggest their own 
projects within very broad parameters. The NIH has created a standing set of 
“parent announcements” that last for a number of years, with standard 
application dates.102 Under the announcements, researchers can propose their 
own project, so long as it fits within the very broad mission of the NIH and 
of the funding Institute (for instance, cancer-related research to be funded by 
the National Cancer Institute).103 The broadest and most well-known of these 
parent announcements is the R01 Research Project Grant, which “supports a 
discrete, specified, circumscribed project in areas representing the specific 
interests and competencies of the investigator(s).”104 Other standing parent 
announcements exist for smaller research projects, grants for training young 
scientists, fellowships, and professional development grants.105 Overall, this set 
of funding represents a “deliberate policy of relying on the judgment of the 
scientific community as a whole, through investigator-initiated proposals, to 
determine the scientific agenda and identify the areas in which progress is most 
likely.”106 Historically, around 80 to 90% of NIH grant awards are 
?
 101. See infra notes 116–119 and accompanying text. 
 102. What Does NIH Look For?, NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/what-does-nih-look-
for.htm [https://perma.cc/C2TU-4FKR] (last updated May 24, 2016); Parent Announcements 
(For Unsolicited or Investigator-Initiated Applications), NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/
parent_announcements.htm [https://perma.cc/7JSK-UWLD] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) 
[hereinafter Parent Announcements]. 
 103. Proposals must fit the mission of an NIH Institute, so unsolicited grants are not a 
pure free-for-all. Nevertheless, the collective set of NIH Institutes covers a very wide swath 
of biomedical research: Institutes focus on general medical sciences, environmental health, 
diseases (cancer, alcohol abuse, drug abuse, allergies, infectious diseases, arthritis, 
musculoskeletal disease, skin disease, deafness, diabetes, digestive disease, kidney disease, 
mental health, neurological disorders, and stroke), minority populations, techniques (genomic 
research, biomedical imagining, bioengineering, nursing, clinical research, information 
technology, and translational science), life stages (aging, child health, and human development) 
and organ systems (eyes, hearts, lungs, blood, and teeth). List of NIH Institutes, supra note 93. 
 104. NIH Research Grant Program (Parent R01), Announcement No. PA-06-160, NIH, 
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-files/PA-16-160.html [https://perma.cc/3V9M-
W2AP] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (announcing availability of R01 grants from 20 National 
Institutes as well as the National Library of Medicine; the National Center for Complementary 
and Integrative Health; and the Office of Research Infrastructure Programs’ Division of 
Program Coordination, Planning and Strategic Initiatives for the three years beginning in May 
2016). 
 105. See Parent Announcements, supra note 102 (listing parent announcements in the R 
(research), T (research training), K (career development), and F (fellowships) series, among 
others). 
 106. INSTITUTE OF MED., NIH EXTRAMURAL CENTER PROGRAMS: CRITERIA FOR 
INITIATION AND EVALUATION 49 (Frederick J. Manning, Michael McGeary & Ronald 
Estabrook eds., 2004). 
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unsolicited.107 
The NIH also solicits research proposals, which look a bit more like 
prizes—albeit very broad prizes—inasmuch as they involve greater ex ante 
decision-making about what areas of innovation are worth funding. Solicited 
proposals are intended to address areas the agency thinks worth funding for a 
variety of reasons, including “to support research in an understudied area of 
science, to take advantage of current scientific opportunities, to address a high 
scientific program priority, or to meet additional needs in research training and 
infrastructure.”108 Soliciting research often deeply engages active researchers; 
Institutes frequently convene groups of scientists who discuss what research 
is ongoing, what opportunities exist, and what the Institute should fund.109 
One scientist described such a group conducted at the National Cancer 
Institute as a “really intense think tank” that realized a need “to bring different 
disciplines together and enable them to really think differently about 
cancer.”110 Once the group of scientists mapped roughly what the program 
should look like to accomplish this scientific/innovation goal, NCI staff “went 
back internal,” and decided how precisely to shape the program.111 The exact 
contours of this process vary substantially across Institutes.112 Even where 
priorities are generated by NIH employees, many of them are trained as 
scientists in their own right.113 
Solicited research programs also grow from top-down priorities. Congress 
?
 107. NIH, Research Project Grants: New (Type 1) Awards and Percentage to Targeted Research 
(1997–2017), https://report.nih.gov/NIHDatabook/Charts/Default.aspx?showm=Y&
chartId=25&catId=2 [https://perma.cc/VAF3-UVBK]. 
 108. What Does NIH Look For?, NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/what-does-nih-look-
for.htm [https://perma.cc/3Y4G-V9H9] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 109. See INSTITUTE OF MED. & COMM. ON THE NIH RESEARCH PRIORITY-SETTING 
PROCESS, SCIENTIFIC OPPORTUNITIES AND PUBLIC NEEDS: IMPROVING PRIORITY SETTING 
AND PUBLIC INPUT AT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 49–51 (1998) (describing 
various bottom-up procedures for setting research priorities at Institutes) [hereinafter IOM, 
PRIORITY SETTING]. 
 110. Interview with Anonymous Senior Scientist (June 7, 2017) (on file with author). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See IOM, PRIORITY SETTING, supra note 109, at 51 (noting “tremendous variability” 
in Institutes’ “systems for receiving advice, planning, and setting priorities . . . . [S]ome 
institutes appear to adopt plans developed by a proactive staff with the endorsement of 
advisory groups, whereas others follow closely the recommendations of external advisory 
groups”). 
 113. See Marion Zatz, A View from the NIH Bridge: Perspectives of a Program Officer, 22 
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY CELL 2661, 2662–63 (2011) (“Like many of my colleagues at the NIH, 
I came to this position following a career as an independent research scientist, where I 
developed many skills that are essential for being a successful researcher or teacher, and for 
being a [program officer].”). 
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can directly set research priorities, either generally, by deciding how much 
money to appropriate to a particular Institute (and, accordingly, its broad 
research focus), or specifically, as the 21st Century Cures Act did in supporting 
the Precision Medicine Initiative.114 The President or other White House 
officials can also drive priorities; President Obama directly proposed the 
Precision Medicine Initiative, aimed at generating and collecting the health data 
of a million Americans for future research purposes, and 2016’s Cancer 
Moonshot, focused on fighting cancer.115 The Human Genome Project was 
similarly the subject of high-level executive focus. The Directors of Institutes 
or of the NIH can also shape the agency’s funding priorities.116 Even if 
priorities are established politically, however, groups of active researchers are 
still involved in determining how the top-down priority should be 
implemented. 
Once the funder has decided what opportunities to pursue, it issues a 
Funding Opportunity Announcement, typically as either a “Program 
Announcement”117 or “Request for Application” (RFA).118 A Program 
Announcement indicates an area of interest, and an RFA formally solicits grant 
applications “in a well-defined scientific area to accomplish specific program 
objectives.”119 It describes how much funding the NIH expects to make 
?
 114. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 1001(b)(4)(A), 130 Stat. 1033 (2016) 
(appropriating $1.455 billion for the Precision Medicine Initiative); id. at § 2011 (amending the 
Public Health Services Act to “encourag[e]” the Secretary of Health and Human Services “to 
establish and carry out . . . the ‘Precision Medicine Initiative’ ”). 
 115. See Jacob S. Sherkow, Cancer’s IP, 96 N.C. L. REV. 297 (2018) (describing the Cancer 
Moonshot and describing the intellectual property challenges arising in the context of cancer). 
 116. The NIH Director is involved in budget negotiations with Congress; Institute 
Directors have final say on areas of funding emphasis and can identify special areas of 
emphasis. See NIH, SETTING RESEARCH PRIORITIES AT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF 
HEALTH 15 (1997). In addition, the Director has substantial influence over a designated 
funding source, the Common Fund, aimed at areas difficult for any single Institute to address 
on its own. See About the NIH Common Fund, NIH, https://commonfund.nih.gov 
[https://perma.cc/GX3T-GUTX] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 117. A Program Announcement is “a formal statement about a new or ongoing 
extramural activity or program. It may serve as a reminder of continuing interest in a research 
area, describe modification in an activity or program, and/or invite applications for grant 
support.” Glossary & Acronym List: Program Announcement (PA), NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/
grants/glossary.htm#ProgramAnnouncement(PA) [https://perma.cc/Z6XH-GBTV] (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 118. A Request for Application is “a formal statement that solicits grant or cooperative 
agreement applications in a well-defined scientific area to accomplish specific program 
objectives.” Glossary & Acronym List: Request for Application (RFA), NIH, 
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/glossary.htm [https://perma.cc/NG99-9QUN] (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2019). 
 119. Id. An RFA can also solicit cooperative agreement applications. Id. 
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available, how many grants it expects to fund, and other logistical details.120 
The process of seeking applications and thereby setting innovation target 
areas is markedly more complicated than suggested by the critique of the grant 
system. There is some truth to the idea that bureaucrats are making decisions; 
the staff of various institutes and centers are involved in setting priorities to 
determine what sorts of innovation may be funded, and in crafting the actual 
RFAs and Program Announcements that formally invite grant applications. 
And “the government,” writ large, can influence what areas are funded: 
Congress can appropriate funds for particular projects (and, indeed, 
appropriates funds separately for each Institute, giving it a chance to prioritize 
the different broad missions), and the White House has been closely involved 
in establishing large-scale research programs.121 Broad political controversies 
can also informally shape researcher behavior.122 But this is far from the whole 
story. The Parent Announcements are broad, standing invitations to seek 
funding for whatever projects a researcher thinks worthy of funding that fits 
within that capacious mission of the NIH, and a majority of research or 
training applications submitted to the NIH fall within such investigator-
initiated categories.123 And even for the more focused Program 
Announcements and RFAs, practicing scientific researchers are involved in 
crafting the rationale for, and the shape of, solicitation for grant applications. 
b)? Peer Review 
The second key funding issue involves individual projects: once areas of 
targeted innovation have been broadly identified, what specific projects should 
be funded, and who should undertake those projects? These two questions are 
tightly blended in the NIH’s peer review system, the heart of the NIH’s grant 
evaluation system. The NIH is required by law to use peer review to evaluate 
grants.124 About 25,000 peer scientists review about 80,000 grant applications 
?
 120. See id. 
 121. See supra note 115, at 299–300 and accompanying text. 
 122. See, e.g., Joanna Kempner, The Chilling Effect: How Do Researchers React to Controversy?, 6 
PLOS MED. 1571, 1571 (2009) (finding that among researchers whose NIH grant proposals 
had been criticized as wasteful in a “highly publicized political controversy,” about half later 
removed controversial words from grants and about a quarter avoided controversial topics); 
Rebecca Hersher, Climate Scientists Watch Their Words, Hoping to Stave Off Funding Cuts, NPR 
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/29/564043596/
climate-scientists-watch-their-words-hoping-to-stave-off-funding-cuts [https://perma.cc/
R5ED-4MDT] (noting a sharp decrease in the phrase “climate change” in NSF grants in 
reaction to the Trump administration’s hostility to the topic).  
 123. See NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 70, at I-46. 
 124. See 42 U.S.C. § 289a (2018). 
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each year in two stages:125 “initial peer review” for “scientific and technical 
merit” and Advisory Council Review, which includes broader policy 
considerations.126 An application must be recommended for approval by both 
levels to be recommended for final funding by an Institute.127 Of the two, the 
initial peer review is far more important for individual grants. 
Initial peer review focuses on the science alone. When researchers submit 
a grant application, the NIH’s Center for Scientific Review checks the 
application for technical details and conformance with the Funding 
Opportunity Announcement, then assigns the application to a Scientific 
Review Group for initial peer review.128 
Scientific Review Groups (Groups) are mostly made up of non-
government scientists with relevant scientific and technical expertise.129 
However, each Group is led by an NIH staff scientist, known as a Scientific 
Review Officer, who recruits reviewers, assigns applications to reviewers for 
pre-meeting review, and prepares summaries of the grant’s evaluation.130 The 
non-federal scientist peer reviewers receive the grant applications several 
weeks in advance of a peer review meeting.131 Each is assigned particular 
applications to pre-review, which includes writing a critique and scoring the 
application preliminarily.132 
Grant applications are scored on several criteria. The most important is 
“overall impact” (“likelihood for the project to exert a sustained, powerful 
influence on the research field(s) involved”).133 Several other criteria are scored; 
for research project grants, these are typically:134 
?
 125. NIH, NIH PEER REVIEW: GRANTS AND COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS (2019). 
 126. Peer Review, NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer-review.htm 
[https://perma.cc/K6ZK-WAEP] (last visited arch 11, 2019) [hereinafter NIH, Peer Review]. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. The NIH provides copious guidance to its peer reviewers, including policies 
on avoiding conflicts of interest, evaluating proposal significance and impact, evaluating 
researcher plans to share data, and evaluating the rigor and transparency of a proposal. See 
generally Consolidated List of Reviewer Documents, NIH https://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer/
reviewer_guidelines.htm [https://perma.cc/E5KX-GF8S] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 133. NIH, Peer Review, supra note 126. 
 134. See Definitions of Criteria and Considerations for Research Project Grant 
(RPG/X01/R01/R03/R21/R33/R34) Critiques, NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer/
critiques/rpg_D.htm#rpg_01 [https://perma.cc/9FGG-2V88] (last visited March 11, 2019) 
[hereinafter NIH, Definitions of Criteria]. Additional criteria may be provided for different grant 
types. Id. 
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Significance: scientific basis for the project, and how it could change and 
improve the field; 
Investigator(s): experience and suitability of the researchers for the 
project, including experience and training (for young investigators) and 
demonstrated accomplishments (for established researchers); 
Innovation: novel (in the field or broadly) paradigms, interventions, 
approaches, etc., to “challenge and seek to shift current research or clinical 
practice paradigms”; 
Approach: “well-reasoned and appropriate” “strategy, methodology, and 
analyses” and design of the project; 
Environment: supportive scientific environment, including institutional 
support.135 
The five criteria listed above, as well as overall impact, are numerically 
scored.136 Additional criteria involve protections for human subjects, diversity, 
animal policies, and others, but these criteria are not scored.137 
Once the assigned peer reviewers have given initial scores, those scores 
(typically just the overall impact score) are used to determine which 
applications will be discussed at the Group meeting; applications that do not 
make the cut (typically the bottom half) are “not discussed” and will not be 
funded.138 At the meeting, the remaining grant applications receive a final 
overall impact score from each non-conflicted Group reviewer; these scores 
are averaged to obtain a final total score, which ranges from 10 (high impact) 
to 90 (low impact).139 
The second level of peer review is by the National Advisory Council or 
National Advisory Board (together, “Council”) associated with the potentially 
funding Institute.140 Each Council comprises both scientists and public 
representatives with an interest in the scientific subject or disease.141 The 
Council does not typically review individual grants; instead, NIH staff 
construct a grant-funding plan based on the results of the initial peer review 
?
 135. Id. 
 136. See Notice NOT-OD-09-024: Enhancing Peer Review: The NIH Announces New Scoring 
Procedures for Evaluation of Research Applications Received for Potential FY2010 Funding, NIH, 
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/not-od-09-024.html [https://perma.cc/
CT4T-8ETT] (noting changes to grant scoring system from a 1-to-5 scale with 0.1 point 
increments to a 1-to-9 integer scale) (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 137. NIH, Peer Review, supra note 126. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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scores, and the Council makes recommendations for changes.142 The Council 
nominally considers broader issues, including the mission of the Institute, the 
balance of funding between different recipients, and priorities of different 
research areas.143 However, Council review, while “not perfunctory,” is “highly 
deferential to study section recommendations.”144 
Finally, the Director of the Institute makes the actual funding decision. 
This decision can be delegated, and often final decisions are made by units 
within an Institute (such as Divisions or Programs).145 
Despite the formal three-stage process—initial peer review for scientific 
merit, Council review for broader considerations, and a Director’s final call—
in practice, the initial peer review almost completely determines the outcome 
for the vast majority of grants.146 Applications are ranked by their final overall 
score, and Institute staff determine, based on available funding, what score is 
necessary for a grant to be funded by the Institute: the “payline.”147 For 
instance, if the payline for a grant is thirty, grants with final overall scores of 
thirty or below are typically funded, and applications with scores above thirty 
are not funded.148 Paylines may also be expressed as percentile scores among 
all submitted grants. For many Institutes, the payline is publicly announced; 
the National Cancer Institute, for instance, announced that for 2016 it would 
fund R01 grants up to the 10th percentile and R21 exploratory grants up to the 
7th percentile “without additional review.”149 There is some flexibility around 
paylines—the paylines are typically different for less-established researchers, 
?
 142. See id. 
 143. For instance, the Council specially reviews individual grant applications where the 
investigator already receives over $1 million in NIH grant funding, though this review does 
not constitute a funding cap. Id. 
 144. McGarity, supra note 91, at 10 (citing DARYL E. CHUBIN & EDWARD J. HACKETT, 
PEERLESS SCIENCE: PEER REVIEW AND U.S. SCIENCE POLICY 2 (1990)). 
 145. See Brian A. Jacob & Lars Lefgren, The Impact of Research Grant Funding on Scientific 
Productivity, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1168, 1169 (2011). 
 146. See id. (“Generally, grants are awarded solely on the basis of priority score.”); see also 
NCI Funding Policy for RPG Awards FY16, NAT’L CANCER INST., 
https://deainfo.nci.nih.gov/grantspolicies/FinalFundLtrArchive/finalfundltr2016.htm 
[https://perma.cc/AK7F-75UQ] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) [hereinafter NCI, 2016 Funding 
Strategy] (“Peer review evaluation of scientific merit will remain the primary consideration in 
these funding decisions, which will be made by NCI Scientific Program Leaders . . . following 
discussions with program staff.”). 
 147. See generally NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 70, at I-73 (noting that 
some Institutes and Centers publish their paylines). 
 148. See Jacob & Lefgren, supra note 145, at 1171 (“[T]he realized cutoff in each situation 
depends on the level of funding for a particular institute, year, and mechanism, along with the 
number and quality of applications submitted.”). 
 149. NCI, 2016 Funding Strategy, supra note 146. 
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for instance,150 and final funding decisions may involve a small fraction of 
“out-of-order” funding based on other priorities of the particular Institute’s 
administration.151 But the vast majority of grants have their fates determined 
by the initial peer review for scientific and technical merit. This helps address 
concerns of cronyism and corruption because panels of peers, not officials, 
largely determine funding. 
Overall, then, the system differs markedly from the simplified version 
presented in the critique of grants. Are government bureaucrats making 
uninformed decisions about what scientific projects get funded? Not really. It 
is true that staff and leaders at the NIH are involved in the process: the Center 
for Scientific Review processes initial applications and assigns them to review 
groups, Scientific Review Officers run the Scientific Review Groups in the 
initial peer review, NIH staff collates scores and prepares funding reports for 
the Councils, and NIH Directors or their delegates make the final decisions. 
But the key determinant of funding is initial peer review. Several scientists with 
expertise in the field read applications; determine how they fare on 
significance, investigator qualifications, innovation, approach, scientific 
environment, and overall impact on the field; and write up scores, critiques, 
and reasoning. Then those scientists meet, discuss the most promising grants, 
and decide their final scores—which projects are most worthy. That’s mostly 
it. Grants are ranked, and the grants judged most worthy are funded until the 
funding runs out (with a bit of wiggle room). 
While the process does not involve the market aggregating private 
information held by firms, it does involve the aggregation of relevant 
information. The grant applicants themselves disclose what they know of the 
innovation’s potential value and their own capacities in the grant application. 
Peer reviewers see that information, have their own information about the 
field, and often can directly compare projects proposed by different 
researchers in the same field. And agency personnel can provide broader 
perspectives about government information. This process is a far cry from the 
notion of an uninformed bureaucrat simply sitting in a room and “picking 
?
 150. See id. (noting that grants submitted by “early stage investigators” (discussed infra at 
Section IV.A.1) would be funded up to the 12th percentile, rather than the 10th percentile for 
other investigators); Jacob & Lefgren, supra note 145, at 1171 (noting that “there is clearly 
evidence of out-of-order funding. In [their] sample [of grant applications], 4% of individuals 
who scored above the cutoff received the grant, while 9% of those below the cutoff did not 
receive a grant or declined the award”). 
 151. See Jacob & Lefgren, supra note 145, at 1169 (“Institute directors have the discretion 
to fund applications out of order on the basis of their subjective judgment of application 
quality, or other factors such as how an application fits with the institute’s mission or whether 
there were a large number of applications submitted on a similar topic.”). 
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winners.” 
c)? Concerns of  Peer Involvement in Funding Decisions 
Peer review of grants certainly brings its own challenges, including bias, 
conformity, and accurate prediction, some of which parallel problems raised 
with peer review of research publications.152 First, bias is frequently raised as a 
concern. Grant applications are generally not anonymous, not least because 
the funding decision depends in part on the qualifications of the researchers 
seeking funding. Because peer scientists are involved in deciding which 
projects receive funding, their decisions could be biased by personal 
animosity,153 prejudices against the personal characteristics of the researcher 
seeking funding,154 competitiveness against researchers in the same field,155 
political pressure,156 or otherwise. Studies have found varying levels of 
evidence for such bias.157 
Second, peer review may create subtle pressure against innovative science: 
peers may prefer grant proposals that do not rock the scientific boat.158 
Thomas Kuhn, an influential sociologist of science, noted that the scientific 
model involves communities of experts making their own decisions about 
what research would progress.159 Nicolas Rasmussen notes that leaving those 
decisions in the hands of top scientists can have the effect of concentrating 
?
 152. See generally CHUBIN & HACKETT, supra note 144 (providing a review of peer review). 
 153. See McGarity, supra note 91, at 5. 
 154. See, e.g., Erika C. Hayden, Racial Bias Haunts NIH Grants, 527 NATURE 286 (2015) 
(finding evidence of racial bias for NIH grant funding); Anna Kaatz et al., Analysis of National 
Institutes of Health R01 Application Critiques, Impact, and Criteria Scores: Does the Sex of the Principal 
Investigator Make a Difference?, 91 ACAD. MED. 1080 (2016) (finding little bias for R01 initial 
grants, but bias against women for R01 renewals). 
 155. See McGarity, supra note 91, at 52–54 (noting the potential for financial or research 
conflicts of interest). But see Managing Conflict of Interest in NIH Peer Review of Grants and Contracts, 
NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer/peer_coi.htm [https://perma.cc/NEN5-L447] 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (describing NIH policies for avoiding peer reviewer conflict of 
interest and providing links to several relevant policies). 
 156. See McGarity, supra note 91, at 7. 
 157. See Simon Wessely, Peer Review of Grant Applications: What Do We Know?, 352 LANCET 
301, 304 (1998) (reviewing sixty-one papers on bias in grant applications and concluding, “[t]he 
main charge against peer review, that of institutional or sex bias, is generally unfounded, with 
a few exceptions”). But see Hayden, supra note 154 (noting evidence of racial bias); Kaatz, supra 
note 154 (noting evidence of sex bias). 
 158. See, e.g., Joshua M. Nicholson & John P.A. Ioannidis, Conform and Be Funded, 492 
NATURE 34 (2012); Michal Shur-Ofry, Nonlinear Innovation, 61 MCGILL L.J. 563, 577–78 (2016) 
(describing resistance among grantors to paradigm-shifting innovation). 
 159. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 37 (2d ed. 1962); 
see also NICOLAS RASMUSSEN, GENE JOCKEYS: LIFE SCIENCE AND THE RISE OF BIOTECH 
ENTERPRISE 24 (2014) (discussing Kuhn). 
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scientific credit, power, and money.160 McGarity draws out the implications of 
this for peer review of grant applications: “An important battleground in the 
war between the [new and old scientific] paradigms is the discretionary grants 
process. People who have spent their careers conducting research aimed at 
bolstering and extending the dominant paradigm are reluctant to direct 
resources toward research aimed at destroying it.”161 There may therefore be a 
preference toward more “mainstream” research proposals over those which 
buck convention.162 Frischmann also notes this concern, arguing that 
innovation may suffer because of competitiveness of the grant system and the 
need for relatively “safe” proposals to ensure funding.163 
The NIH explicitly fights back against any tendency to prioritize “safe” 
science; reviewers are required to numerically score a grant proposal for 
innovation, including the question, “Does the application challenge and seek 
to shift current research or clinical practice paradigms by utilizing novel 
theoretical concepts, approaches or methodologies, instrumentation, or 
interventions?”164 In addition, grant programs can specifically prioritize 
boundary-crossing interdisciplinary work, as described below.165 But the 
concern persists. 
Third, some doubt whether peer review is accurate: is it good at sorting 
out good ideas and grant applications from bad ones? The answer to this seems 
to be a cautious and qualified “yes.” Figuring out whether peer review 
accurately identifies projects most likely to succeed is challenging; basic 
research, in particular, is typically likely to fail, and paradigm-changing research 
is perhaps the most likely to fail, almost by definition.166 Evidence suggests that 
peer review can probably discriminate sound applications from seriously 
flawed applications.167 However, beyond that distinction, scholars debate 
whether better-scored grants are actually more productive.168 
?
 160. RASMUSSEN, supra note 159, at 24. 
 161. McGarity, supra note 91, at 41. 
 162. Id. at 40; see Pedraza-Fariña & Bair, supra note 17, at 1097 (identifying this problem 
and describing it as an anti-innovation “research priority norm”). 
 163. Frischmann, supra note 31, at 389 n.184 (citing STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON 
SCIENCE, 105TH CONG., 1ST SESS., UNLOCKING OUR FUTURE: TOWARD A NEW NATIONAL 
SCIENCE POLICY 19–20 (Comm. Print 1998)).  
 164. NIH, Definitions of Criteria, supra note 134. 
 165. See infra Section IV.B.3. 
 166. See Nelson, supra note 25, at 304. 
 167. See Ferric C. Fang, Anthony Bowen & Arturo Casadevall, NIH Peer Review Percentile 
Scores are Poorly Predictive of Grant Productivity, 5 ELIFE e13323 (2016). 
 168. Compare id. (finding little relationship between percentile score and grant 
productivity), with Danielle Li & Leila Agha, Big Names or Big Ideas: Do Peer-Review Panels Select 
the Best Science Proposals?, 348 SCIENCE 434 (2015) (finding a strong relationship between those 
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Overall, deep peer involvement, whether in the process of seeking 
applications and therefore identifying areas of innovation (broad or narrow) 
or in the process of choosing projects and individuals to fund, casts a 
substantially different light on the grant-funding process. Peer involvement in 
picking projects has its flaws; it might involve bias, it might suggest safe 
science, and it is certainly imperfect at identifying the best projects for funding. 
Similarly, the process of identifying areas of potential innovation, which relies 
both on peer involvement and on targeting by agency or other government 
actors with an eye toward social welfare priorities (or patronage, or pork), has 
its own flaws and idiosyncrasies. But of course, so does the principal 
alternative—a market-based system that relies on the incentives of private 
actors to decide what innovation is best to pursue, not based on evaluations 
of scientific merit or social welfare value, but on a calculus of what profits are 
appropriable through an imperfect intellectual property system or otherwise.169 
Grants aren’t perfect; they’re just different, and more interestingly different 
than is often assumed. 
2. Unaccountable Ex Ante Incentives 
Grants provide complex incentives for innovative effort. Several accounts 
critique grants as providing essentially only ex ante incentives, which may be 
less effective in motivating research effort because the innovator has fewer 
incentives to work efficiently.170 As with grant funding, however, grant 
spending is more complicated. First, the NIH uses some modest tools to 
ensure that researchers are in fact working on what they proposed. Generally 
applicable anti-fraud laws also limit what researchers can do with government 
money, but typically apply only to behavior that significantly deviates from the 
purposes of the grant.171 Second, and far more important, grants are not one-
?
measures). 
 169. See, e.g., Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 43, at 1907 (arguing that “patent rights have 
the potential to predictably and systematically distort private investment decisions over 
innovations by overstating the value of highly excludable information goods and understating 
the value of highly nonexcludable ones”); Ofer Tur-Sinai, Technological Progress and Well-Being, 
48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 145, 156–59 (2016) (cataloging scholarly critiques of patents and markets 
as an innovation allocation mechanism); id. at 161–75 (arguing that even if patents and markets 
did well in satisfying preferences, they still do a relatively poor job of increasing well-being). 
 170. See supra Section II.B. 
 171. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2018) (prohibiting making false 
claims); United States ex rel. Feldman v. van Gorp, 697 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding fraud 
when an NIH-funded fellowship program at Cornell Weill Medical College deviated 
substantially from the grant application and continuing reports); U.S. Office of Inspector 
Gen., Grant Fraud, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/
fraud/grant/index.asp [https://perma.cc/96XZ-TWEW] (describing grant fraud generally). 
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off events: researchers work as repeat players within a grant ecosystem where 
getting the next grant is an ongoing career imperative, and getting that next 
grant depends on productive outcomes from the current grant.172 
a)? Progress and Reporting Obligations 
Grants do come with some continuing obligations that allow monitoring 
and control by the NIH. Rarely, grants have explicit requirements for progress 
that the NIH requires before additional funding is disbursed. For instance, a 
request for applications for high-risk, high-reward HIV vaccine research grants 
states that each application must include explicit Go/No-Go success criteria 
to be evaluated by the end of the second year of the nominally four-year grant; 
if the Go criteria are not met, the grant winds down with substantially 
decreased funding.173 The center grants supporting the Human Genome 
Project also had robust accountability and control mechanisms to help drive a 
broad, expensive, collaborative enterprise.174 But these mechanisms are 
unusual; most NIH grants include little more than reporting requirements.175 
The NIH usually requires that grant recipients submit financial and 
progress reports at least annually.176 Recipients must also disclose whether any 
potentially patentable inventions were made in the funded project, both under 
the Bayh-Dole Act and independently under NIH policy.177 Grant recipients 
?
 172. In addition, of course, the grant system does not exist in isolation; researchers who 
produce patentable inventions can patent them and receive some of the resulting royalties. See 
supra notes 63–66 (discussing the Bayh-Dole Act). I view this incentive as one created by the 
patent system, however, and not as one internal to the grant system. 
 173. Request for Application PAR-16-171: Innovation for HIV Vaccine Discovery (R01), NAT’L 
INST. ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-
files/PAR-16-171.html [https://perma.cc/TXC6-MK5M] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) 
[hereinafter, NIAID, HIV RFA]. 
 174. See STEPHEN HILGARTNER, REORDERING LIFE: KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL IN 
THE GENOMICS REVOLUTION 96–98 (2017) (noting that genome sequencing centers would be 
subject to annual progress reports, frequent scientific reviews, meetings with NIH Center 
Directors, and rigorous evaluations on which future funding would be contingent); id. at 98–
104 (detailing scientific evaluation strategies). 
 175. See NIAID, HIV RFA, supra note 173 (“[A]pplications should be very different from 
conventional investigator-initiated R01 applications . . . . Applications that do not include 
Go/No-Go decision criterion/criteria will be considered incomplete and will not be 
reviewed.”). 
 176. See NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 70, at IIA-135. For many rewards, 
including R01 grants, financial reports need only be submitted at the end of the full grant 
period. Id. at IIA-125–26. 
 177. See id. at IIA-130; see also 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2018). But see Arti K. Rai & Bhaven N. 
Sampat, Accountability in Patenting of Federally Funded Research, 30 NAT. BIOTECHNOLOGY 953 
(2012) (noting that many Bayh-Dole reporting mandates go unfollowed). 
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are also subject to audit.178 Failure to follow reporting requirements, or failure 
to comply with other terms of the grant, can theoretically result in disallowing 
costs, withholding future grant awards, suspending the grant, or even 
terminating the grant.179 At least in part, these reporting requirements should 
encourage grant recipients to work toward the goals of the grant, in contrast 
to a purely ex ante award with no oversight or reporting mechanisms at all. 
b)? Repeat Players 
The most important reporting of grant progress comes not in response to 
the current grant but in applying for the next grant. Grants terms are measured 
in years; researcher careers are measured in decades (or, at least, most 
researchers hope so). Failure to get subsequent grants can result in the 
downsizing of a lab or the end of a career, making researchers repeat players.180 
As Gallini and Scotchmer noted, the “moral hazard” of non-contingent ex ante 
funding for a single grant “is overcome because future grants are contingent on 
previous success.”181 They argue that in practice, grants “operate much like 
prizes, with the wrinkle that a researcher must convince the sponsor in advance 
that his output might be worthy of a prize. For this purpose, his reputation 
might suffice, and in some cases, much of the research has already been 
completed.”182 
NIH grant-funding policy follows this pattern. The NIH scores grant 
applications on five main criteria, including “Investigator(s)” (the scientist 
running the project). “If [non-established], do they have appropriate 
experience and training? If established, have they demonstrated an ongoing 
record of accomplishments that have advanced their field(s)?”183 In addition, 
many NIH grant types effectively require substantial preliminary data, which 
?
 178. See NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 70, at IIA-143–46. 
 179. See id. at IIA-135. Grant termination is rare, though NIH does not track such 
occurrences. See Jef Akst, Wanted: Records of Revoked Grants, SCIENTIST (Jan. 20, 2010), 
https://www.the-scientist.com/the-nutshell/wanted-records-of-revoked-grants-43553 
[https://perma.cc/6EB7-GM4X]; cf. Jef Akst, 3 Calif Stem Cell Grants Revoked, SCIENTIST 
(Nov. 3, 2009), https://www.the-scientist.com/the-nutshell/3-calif-stem-cell-grants-revoked-
43763 [https://perma.cc/3TPS-QBGC] (noting the revocation of three grants by the 
California Institute of Regenerative Medicine for insufficient progress). 
 180. See Adam Ruben, Another Tenure-Track Scientist Bites the Dust, SCIENCE (Jul. 19, 2017), 
http://www.sciencemag.org/careers/2017/07/another-tenure-track-scientist-bites-dust 
[https://perma.cc/777E-4M9V] (giving an example of how failure to get a grant can end a 
career). 
 181. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 38, at 54. 
 182. Id.; see also Hanson, supra note 52, at 5 (“[C]ompetitive grants, which fund much of 
today’s best basic research, can be viewed as a small prize for thinking up a promising topic, 
coupled with a larger but still moderate grant for working on that topic.”). 
 183. NIH, Definitions of Criteria, supra note 134. 
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serves to demonstrate (a) the project’s feasibility; (b) the researcher’s training 
and ability to generate data; and (c) the researcher’s willingness to spend 
resources on the project even before this grant is funded.184 This last point is 
in some tension with the idea that grants help free researchers from capital 
constraints,185 but reinforces the serial nature of grant funding. Productivity 
under one grant—experiments conducted, expertise acquired, data generated, 
and papers published—is relevant to the NIH in deciding whether to fund the 
next grant, whether a competitive extension of the same project, a new grant 
for a related project, or an entirely different project led by the same 
experienced, productive researcher. 
Figure 1 illustrates this pattern. It schematically shows the grants that 
might be received by a (rather successful) hypothetical researcher; we’ll call her 
Jenn.  
Figure 1: Schematic of serial and parallel grants 
?
 184. Many but not all grant types require preliminary data; for instance, R01 grants require 
fairly substantial preliminary data, but grants focused on small studies or phased innovation 
(R00, R21, and R21/33 grants) need not include preliminary data, particularly if the projects 
are exploratory or pilot studies. See id. 
 185. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 2, at 308. Without initial resources, securing 
preliminary results to obtain grant funding can be hard to do. The repeat nature of grants, 
discussed in the next Section, somewhat obviates this concern, with two caveats. First, it does 
not apply to initial entry to the grant system, and therefore may penalize new innovators who 
lack the resources to generate preliminary data on their first projects (especially if, unlike the 
example to follow, they do not follow a research-intensive path into becoming an innovator). 
Second, it may shape the direction of research, because preliminary results may not support 
future projects that are very far afield from the earlier work. 
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Initially, Jenn is supported by an F32 postdoctoral fellowship, which 
supports postdoctoral research and training. Jenn is working on Project Blue, 
under the direction of the head of her lab, Durona (the fact that Jenn is not 
the principal investigator is indicated by the stippling in the figure); Durona 
also certainly has her own funding, which supports Project Blue. Jenn uses the 
data acquired from that work to propose a related project, Project Purple; she 
applies for a K99/R00 Career Development Award, designed to help her 
transition into the role of an independent researcher. Getting this type of two-
tiered award is contingent on Jenn’s baseline qualifications, but also on how 
well she has done in her earlier work. It is therefore extremely challenging to 
get a K99/R00 grant without a record of peer-reviewed scientific publications 
(as well as a solid research plan and the other requirements for a grant).186 Jenn 
gets the combination grant, and for two years she is funded by the K99 as a 
postdoctoral fellow in Durona’s lab, still working under her mentorship (as the 
K99 requires). Then, contingent on Jenn’s appointment as an independent, full 
time faculty member, she receives R00 funding to continue work on a 
broadened Project Purple in her own lab. 
Two years later, Project Purple has borne fruit; the main project has 
developed, resulting in publications, more data, and more possibilities, and 
Jenn is ready to expand the project substantially. She applies for and receives 
an R01 Research Project Grant to continue and expand the main thrust of 
Project Purple: five years of substantial funding, enough to support a doctoral 
student and a postdoctoral fellow. But again, getting the R01 depends in large 
part on Jenn’s research productivity while supported by the R00. Five years 
after getting the R01 for Project Purple, it expires; Jenn applies for a renewal 
(R01’), which is subject to the normal competitive grant process. For the 
continuation of Project Purple, Jenn’s lab, and Jenn’s own scientific career, 
productive work under each grant is essential. This is not to say that success is 
essential; the NIH knows that innovative research often fails. But future grants 
depend on actually doing the work. 
Cross-grant contingency is not only serial but also parallel: many 
researchers work on multiple grants simultaneously. In an academic lab, the 
principal investigator who heads the lab may have working with him multiple 
doctoral students, multiple postdoctoral fellows, and perhaps a few 
technicians, working on different projects and supported by different grants—
?
 186. The overall success rate for 2017 K99 applications was 23.4%, but that already 
excludes all the candidates who did not apply because their credentials were insufficient. See 
NIH, CAREER DEVELOPMENT AWARDS: APPLICATIONS, AWARDS, SUCCESS RATES, AND 
FUNDING, BY INSTITUTE/CENTER AND ACTIVITY CODE (2018). 
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all of which partially support the principal investigator herself. Typically, these 
grants will be staggered in time. Even if productive results from one grant are 
not directly prerequisite for a staggered grant on a different project, outcomes 
such as papers, awards, expertise, and prizes all matter in determining whether 
the investigator is likely to succeed in the parallel project, and therefore 
whether the funder should approve that other application. 
Figure 1 also shows this dynamic. At the end of Jenn’s R00, she has 
developed another interesting line of research, and applies for an R03 Small 
Grant to pursue it. Unfortunately, Project Red doesn’t pan out and two years 
later the funding runs out. Meanwhile, Project Purple continues; a couple of 
years later, it suggests another line of inquiry, and Jenn applies for and receives 
an R21 Exploratory/Developmental Grant for Project Navy (that grant 
requires no preliminary data, but she uses some evidence from Project Purple 
to support the application anyway). After two years, she has enough data from 
the R21 on Project Navy to get the R33 Exploratory/Developmental Grant 
Phase II. For each of these parallel applications, Jenn doesn’t have the same 
sort of robust earlier data that needs to underline the serial line of Project 
Purple grants above. But when the Scientific Review Group conducts its initial 
peer review of her application,187 it will see what she published in the course 
of her Project Purple work, expertise she has acquired, the experience of any 
postdoctoral fellows she has hired to do work, and similar progress markers. 
They all matter for her success as a researcher, and they all matter to peer 
reviewers for other grants. 
In sum, while the ex ante nature of any one grant largely follows the critique 
that grants have limited ability to drive post-award researcher effort, no single 
grant paints the whole picture. Instead, researchers are repeat players in a 
system where multiple grants matter, both in parallel and serially, on the same 
or related projects. In this broader context, the success or productivity of work 
under a particular grant has far-reaching consequences on future funding, both 
for the researcher and for others working in her lab. 
3. Problematic Risk Allocation 
The third critique suggests that grants poorly allocate downside and upside 
risk between the funder and the recipient; a more comprehensive 
understanding of what benefits and costs are relevant to the NIH suggests that 
this critique, too, is incomplete. Of course, much of the point of grants is that 
the government explicitly does not benefit directly from successful projects (if 
?
 187. See supra Section II.B.1. 
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it did, these instruments would be procurement contracts instead of grants).188 
Instead, grants have long been considered a way to create public goods from 
which the government does not directly benefit. Nevertheless, some have 
raised the concern that the allocation of downside and upside risk is 
problematic.189 Poorly allocated risk can raise problems in both directions. If 
downside risk (that is, the risk of failure) is allocated entirely to the 
government, the researcher has decreased incentives to avoid failure. And if 
upside risk is allocated entirely to the researcher, the government may not reap 
much from its spending. Taken together, these two sides of risk allocation 
could also encourage researchers to pursue overly risky plans, since they 
capture most of the benefit of success but face little of the cost of failure. A 
richer conception of the grant system and the NIH’s general mission reduces 
all three concerns. 
Downside risk invites the most straightforward rebuttal. The government 
does not bear downside risk alone. Researchers also face downside risks from 
project failures. While the NIH does not require success from its funded 
projects—science is risky, and innovative science more so—nevertheless it is 
easier to generate data, and especially to publish in prestigious peer-reviewed 
journals, if research achieves its stated goals. This bias in favor of positive 
results has its own powerful negative consequences for science,190 but it does 
keep some of the risk of failure squarely on the researcher. Failing to receive 
or renew grant funding results in a range of consequences that can hit a 
researcher hard, including shame among peers, the inability to hire (or the need 
to fire) subordinates, denial of tenure or promotion, and the end of a lab and 
a career.191 
The question of upside risk allocation shifts substantially when taking into 
account the NIH’s mission.192 Consider an expensive NIH investment in 
research that leads to the development of a new drug. In all likelihood, a drug 
company licenses the exclusive rights to that drug, takes it to market, and reaps 
?
 188. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra Section II.A.3. 
 190. An exploration of the negative repercussions of the publication bias for favorable 
results is fascinating but outside the scope of this Article. For an introduction to the area, see 
Michal Shur-Ofry, Access-to-Error, 34 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 357 (2016); John P.A. 
Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False, 2 PLoS MED. 696 (2005); see also Jacob 
S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J. 845, 852–65 (2017) (discussing 
the related problem of irreproducibility in science). 
 191. See Ruben, supra note 180. 
 192. See Mission and Goals, NIH, https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/mission-
goals [https://perma.cc/8WD4-9Q5D] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) [hereinafter NIH, Mission 
and Goals]. 
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billions in profit while the NIH and the government see no profits; in fact, the 
latter pays billions to the drug company through public health insurance.193 
This dynamic is subject to a powerful critique—why doesn’t the government 
benefit from its grant funding?194 Simply put, it does.195 
There are several upsides to research that the government is well 
positioned to capture. The simplest is that research may solve a public 
problem; a new vaccine will keep people from getting sick, and the government 
may benefit both monetarily (paying less to take care of sick people) and in its 
role as representative of the public (which benefits by being healthier). 
A second, well-recognized benefit is that research generates information 
that is a public good with substantial externalities; this is perhaps the strongest 
justification for grants generally.196 This is true both for basic research, the 
value of which is very hard to capture but which enables other innovation, and 
for applied research, which creates the same sort of knowledge spillovers.197 
Generating this knowledge accords with the NIH’s mission, which includes 
“expand[ing] the knowledge base in medical and associated sciences.”198 More 
broadly, the government in its role as social welfare coordinator and social 
?
 193. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: NIH-PRIVATE 
SECTOR PARTNERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT IN TAXOL 13 (2003) (“NIH Invested Heavily 
in Taxol-Related Research, but Federal Financial Benefits Have Been Limited.”). While Taxol 
related from a cooperative research and development agreement (CRADA) rather than a grant, 
the argument is essentially parallel, and recurs today. See, e.g., Matt Richtel & Andrew Pollack, 
Harnessing the U.S. Taxpayer to Fight Cancer and Make Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/health/harnessing-the-us-taxpayer-to-fight-cancer-
and-make-profits.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/5349-B9C7] (asking, about government 
investment in CAR-T immunotherapy for cancer, “Are taxpayers getting a good deal?”). 
 194. See Mariana Mazzucato, How Taxpayers Prop up Big Pharma, and How to Cap That, L.A. 
TIMES (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1027-mazzucato-big-
pharma-prices-20151027-story.html [https://perma.cc/N7FS-6XU5]; Gerard Anderson, Big 
Pharma Should Support the NIH, BALT. SUN (Apr. 17, 2015), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-medical-innovations-act-
20150417-story.html [https://perma.cc/6PRP-8WNH]. 
 195. Issues of drug pricing are complex and far outside the scope of this piece. For an 
overview, see generally Ari B. Friedman & Janet Weiner, What’s the Story with Drug Prices?, PENN 
LDI (May 30, 2016), https://ldi.upenn.edu/healthpolicysense/what%E2%80%99s-story-
drug-prices [https://perma.cc/7FCT-7GRU]. 
 196. See Nelson, supra note 25, at 302–04. 
 197. See Frischmann, supra note 31, at 389 (“The uncontrollable risks are borne by the 
government and are, in a sense, considered small because spillovers are welcome.”); cf. Danielle 
Li, Pierre Azoulay & Bhaven N. Sampat, The Applied Value of Public Investments in Biomedical 
Research, 356 SCIENCE 78, 78–80 (2017) (finding that around 10% of NIH grants are directly 
cited by patents and 30% are cited in publications that are themselves cited in patents; for 
patents on approved drugs, the rates are around 1% and 5%, respectively). 
 198. NIH, Mission and Goals, supra note 192. 
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representative realizes the benefits of those knowledge spillovers. 
The public good of knowledge spillovers, however, is broader than that 
created by successful research. Negative information—what doesn’t work, 
what paths are unproductive, and the like—is also useful information to both 
the government as a whole and to the NIH in particular. Among other things, 
it can help future grantees avoid fruitless research paths. Negative information 
can also be difficult for private firms to capture.199 
Finally, and this upside is less often acknowledged, a substantial goal for 
the NIH is to build human and institutional capital in science. The NIH states 
that one of its four goals is “to develop, maintain, and renew scientific human 
and physical resources that will ensure the Nation’s capability to prevent 
disease.”200 As a matter of both national and NIH policy, we want more trained 
scientists around. Their knowledge and expertise helps drive innovation across 
many fields. It is a positive outcome when the NIH funds, trains, and develops 
scientists, even if research projects fail to produce immediately valuable 
findings. Jacob and Lefgren find empirical evidence of successful grant-funded 
development: receipt of a postdoctoral fellowship (NIH’s F32 grant) increases 
the chance of a young scientist becoming a successful researcher by almost a 
quarter.201 
These two realities of downside and upside risk—that researchers do 
suffer from failed projects and that even risky projects can generate negative 
knowledge and human capital—address the concern that risk allocation will 
push researchers toward overly risky research projects. However, even if risk 
allocation does push researchers toward riskier projects, such an effect may be 
justified for two reasons. First, a risk-allocation-based push toward riskier 
research may counterbalance the possibility that grant-funders could prefer 
“safer” research.202 Second, riskier research is likely to be a less attractive target 
for private investment;203 to the extent that grant funding is especially 
?
 199. See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 43, at 1926–28 (noting the difficulty of capturing 
the benefits of negative knowledge through patents). But see Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Spill Your 
(Trade) Secrets: Knowledge Networks as Innovation Drivers, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1597–98 
(2017) (discussing firm ability to capture negative knowledge through trade secrecy). 
 200. NIH, Mission and Goals, supra note 192. 
 201. Brian A. Jacob & Lars Lefgren, The Impact of NIH Postdoctoral Training Grants on 
Scientific Productivity, 40 RES. POL’Y 864, 873 (2011). 
 202. See Pierre Azoulay, Joshua S. Graff Zivin & Gustavo Manso, Incentives and creativity: 
evidence from the academic life sciences, 42 RAND J. ECON. 527, 531 (2011) (noting NIH grant 
funding incentives to pursue comparatively safe research). But see Hyunwoo Park, Jeongsik Lee 
& Byung-Cheol Kim, Project selection in NIH: A natural experiment from ARRA, 44 RES. POL’Y 
1145, 1158 (2015) (finding that NIH selects and funds riskier projects than expected). 
 203. Nelson, supra note 25, at 302–04. 
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appropriate where private firms are unlikely to invest, riskier research needs 
grant funding more. 
* * * 
The NIH’s vast system of grant funding reflects a richer and more complex 
reality than is captured in common depictions and critiques of grants. Funding 
decisions are not made principally by bureaucrats, but rather by panels of peer 
scientific experts working in concert with agency staff. Researchers respond to 
grant incentives not in a one-off, wholly ex ante vision that provides little drive 
for efficiency or success, but rather in an iterative context of serial and parallel 
grants where researchers are repeat players and success matters in receiving the 
next essential grant. And grants do not allocate downside risk just to the 
government and upside risk just to the grantee, but rather allocate a 
combination of upside and downside risks to each party. 
To be sure, the experience of the NIH does not demonstrate that these 
critiques never hold—just that they do not hold at the NIH. A comparative 
survey of different grant systems is outside the scope of this work. However, 
there is reason to think that these insights are relatively generalizable. Peer 
review is widely used to allocate grant funds.204 Where grant awards depend in 
part on prior work, and where such awards are insufficient to individually 
support an entire career, the repeat-player nature of the grant system should 
create accountability mechanisms—and those two conditions are likely to hold 
in most contexts. Finally, in most grant systems the recipients are likely to 
experience some downside risk of project failure (for the same reason), and 
the government to experience upside benefits. 
Overall, grants are a more nuanced policy instrument than these critiques 
reflect. The next Part describes how they can and do help promote a broad set 
of innovation goals. 
IV.? GRANTS AS INNOVATION LEVERS 
Grants can do much more than is commonly recognized. In fact, they 
already do. The two Sections of this Part each focus on one of the two key 
comparative strengths of grants: creating incentives for goods whose social 
welfare exceeds appropriable market value and directly supporting the 
development of innovation enablers. The paradigmatic version of a grant, in 
?
 204. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 91, at 15–37 (describing peer review systems at the 
National Science Foundation, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the National 
Endowment for the Arts); Grimpe, supra note 85, at 1450–51 (noting the presence of peer 
review in the German scientific grant system). 
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the NIH context, does both of these things: an R01 basic research grant creates 
information useful principally for later innovation, and markets value that 
information for less than its social-welfare value. Because this is the 
paradigmatic version, on which most conceptions of government grants are 
based and which has been the dominant version throughout the rest of this 
paper, I do not describe it in detail. Instead, this Section focuses on ways grants 
can, do, and could promote innovation in non-paradigmatic ways. 
A.? SOCIAL/MARKET VALUE MISMATCHES 
Grants provide a useful tool to create incentives where social value exceeds 
appropriable market value. This comparative strength neatly inverts the lauded 
ability of patents and other exclusivity mechanisms to use market signals of 
social value. Patents, the argument goes, are useful and efficient innovation 
incentives because the value a firm can realize from a patented innovation 
increases with the social value of the innovation, as measured by the market 
price and demand for that innovation.205 But of course that argument doesn’t 
always hold. Sometimes—some very important times—the value a firm can 
capture through patents doesn’t reflect the social value of the innovation. One 
such mismatch exists when market demand fails to reflect social value because 
of a lack of willingness or ability to pay, as with treatments for diseases of the 
poor. A second mismatch happens when, although market demand might 
match social demand, existing appropriation mechanisms do not allow firms 
to appropriate an innovation’s value—in effect, when existing intellectual 
property mechanisms fail, as with medical diagnostics.206 Two sets of 
requirements shape the NIH’s ability to drive innovation in these areas: the 
Bayh-Dole Act’s requirements governing patent rights in innovations funded 
by government grants and the NIH’s data-sharing requirements. 
The Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to retain rights to inventions funded 
by federal grant money.207 Instead of the federal government retaining patent 
rights, the Bayh-Dole Act lets universities or other nonprofits patent grant-
funded innovations and license the patents to private firms for development.208 
The scheme aims to promote the commercialization of inventions by private 
firms, though the extent to which Bayh-Dole is necessary or beneficial is the 
?
 205. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra note 21; infra Section III.A.2. One can also describe infrastructure 
investment, with its positive externalities, as a good whose appropriable market value does not 
scale with its social value. Because grants target innovation infrastructure and other enablers 
in a particularly distinct way, this opportunity is discussed in the next Section. 
 207. 35 U.S.C. § 202. 
 208. Id. For-profit grant recipients were added to the scheme by executive order. Exec. 
Order No. 12618, 52 C.F.R. 48661 (1987). 
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subject of considerable debate.209 The government retains the right to “march 
in” and license the invention to another licensee if it is not made “reasonably 
available” by the commercializing entity, and also retains a nonexclusive license 
to make the invention available for government purposes.210 The march-in 
right, however, has never been exercised,211 and the government’s own 
licensing ability has long laid dormant, though recent scholarship has 
attempted to revive it.212 As Ayres and Ouellete note, the Bayh-Dole regime 
may have the effect of using public funding to create public goods, but then 
creating rewards greater than needed to develop them in the private context.213 
The NIH’s data-sharing policies also shape the availability of the fruits of 
grant-funded research. NIH policy requires researchers to make peer-reviewed 
publications resulting from grant-funded research freely available to the public 
one year after initial publication.214 In addition, any “unique research 
resources” made with NIH funding, such as new cell lines or genetic databases, 
should “be made readily available for research purposes to qualified individuals 
within the scientific community.”215 These policies help insure that grant-
funded research becomes available but consequently limit the availability of 
trade secrecy as a non-patent appropriation mechanism. 
  
?
 209. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. 271 (2017) (describing the inefficiency of the Bayh-Dole system and 
proposing a market mechanism for licensing of grant-funded inventions); Daniel J. Hemel & 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Bayh-Dole Beyond Borders, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 282 (2017) (justifying 
the Bayh-Dole regime as useful to respond to challenges of global freeriding); Frischmann, 
supra note 31, at 399–413 (describing and critiquing the Bayh-Dole system of mixed grants and 
privately licensed patents); Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Procuring Knowledge, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 1, 26 (2004) (noting that if the Bayh-
Dole Act solves any problem, it solves a problem with intellectual property law). 
 210. See 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2018); see also Hannah Brennan et al., A 
Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 275 (2016) (describing the history of § 1498 and arguing that the federal government 
can use it today to buy generic versions of expensive drugs for far less than their list prices). 
 211. Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 209, at 321; see also Ryan Whalen, The Bayh-Dole Act & 
Public Rights in Federally Funded Inventions: Will the Agencies Ever Go Marching In?, 109 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1083 (2015). 
 212. See Brennan et al., supra note 210, at 280. 
 213. See supra note 209. 
 214. NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 70, at IIA-116. 
 215. Id. at IIA-117; see Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants 
and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources, 64 Fed. Reg. 
72090 (Dec. 23, 1999). 
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1. Social Value Exceeding Market Value 
Grants can fund innovation whose social welfare value exceeds the market 
value of the product. Rachel Sachs notes, 
Where the general population’s willingness and ability to pay for a 
particular drug track the social value it contributes, patents are 
thought to provide a relatively efficient way of incentivizing the 
development of socially valuable drugs. But each of these factors—
willingness to pay and ability to pay—presents a well-known bias, 
through which innovation incentives will be directed away from 
certain types of treatments or diseases with high social salience.216 
Willingness to pay creates a mismatch between social and private value. 
For some innovations, social benefits exceed individual benefits; for example, 
vaccines protect both the vaccinated individuals and others in society through 
the process of herd immunity.217 Optimism bias may also decrease willingness 
to pay because people don’t think they will get sick, and therefore underpay 
for preventive measures, decreasing incentives for scientists to develop those 
measures.218 Finally, short-term bias may cause individuals to systematically 
undervalue expensive cures as opposed to ongoing treatments, which are 
cheaper per instance but costlier over time.219 These distortions are not limited 
to the biomedical context—individuals may undervalue vehicle safety 
innovations that protect other drivers, upgrades that prevent house 
deterioration down the road, and technologies like solar roofs that pay for 
?
 216. Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 168–69 (2016). Sachs suggests that insurance reimbursement may 
suggest another avenue to create incentives for this type of innovation. Id. at 178–93. Amy 
Kapczynski expands this argument generally in Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and 
How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970 (2012). 
 217. Sachs, supra note 216, at 169. 
 218. Id. at 169–70 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay vs. Welfare, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 303, 325 (2007)). 
 219. Id. at 170. As Sachs notes, the story of Sovaldi, a drug which cures Hepatitis C, which 
itself primarily afflicts the poor, is somewhat miraculous. The typical story of drug market 
incentives suggests that firms should not be especially interested in a drug that treats a disease 
mostly afflicting those without substantial resources to pay, nor a drug that cures a chronic 
disease rather than treating it profitably for a long time. Sovaldi is both, and even its frequently-
cited high sticker price represents a substantial savings over current treatment options. See 
Nicholas Bagley, Does It Break the Law to Charge a Lot for a Cure?, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST 
(Jan. 28, 2016), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/does-it-break-the-law-to-
charge-a-lot-for-a-cure/ [https://perma.cc/32RS-RCXB] (quoting an email from Rachel 
Sachs to this effect). Outside biomedical innovation, climate change technology provides 
tremendous social benefits in the future, but current costs make appropriate market valuation 
of climate-change innovation challenging. See generally Ofer Tur-Sinai, Patents and Climate 
Change: A Skeptic’s View, 48 ENV. L. REV. 211 (2018).  
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themselves in long-term energy savings.220 
Ability to pay also limits market incentives and makes them inadequate for 
some socially valuable innovations. Consider Chagas, chikungunya, and other 
Neglected Tropical Diseases, which in the United States afflict mostly the poor 
and underinsured;221 mental illness is similarly more prevalent among those 
populations.222 Because those who can’t pay for drugs can’t create market 
demand, we should expect investment in treatments for those diseases to be 
substantially less than the social value of such innovation.223 
These are not the only ways that market demand can create problematic 
incentives to pursue certain types of innovation. As Kevin Outterson has long 
argued, antibiotic resistance is a tremendous problem of global scale, caused 
in part by warped incentives for development of new antibiotics.224 Antibiotic 
overuse limits the value of antibiotics for future users, but sellers of new 
antibiotics profit more from selling lots of the antibiotics before resistance sets 
in, rather than limiting their use.225 Accordingly, new antibiotics aren’t kept in 
reserve, and society loses the very large benefit of having a robust arsenal of 
last-resort antibiotics.226 Unfortunately but perhaps unsurprisingly, the past 
several decades have seen little in the way of new antibiotics, and the looming 
threat of global antibiotic resistance is increasingly worrisome.227 
Grants can step in to support research in these areas of unmet need. In 
2012, for instance, the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases 
funded eight Tropical Medicine Research Centers through P50 Research 
Center grants.228 The Centers are located in regions where the neglected 
tropical diseases are prevalent: Brazil, India, Ghana, and Peru.229 These grants 
?
 220. See Howard Kunreuther & Elke U. Weber, Aiding Decision Making to Reduce the Impacts 
of Climate Change, 37 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 397, 402–04 (2014). 
 221. Sachs, supra note 216, at 154, 170–71. 
 222. Id. at 170–71. 
 223. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 39, at 1718 (“One of the problems of being poor is that 
you do not have any money and therefore cannot spend a lot of money on drugs, even though 
if you do not buy the drugs you may die.”). 
 224. See generally Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The Role of Antibiotic 
Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 613 (2010). 
 225. Id. at 627. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See Dalia Deak et al., Progress in the Fight Against Multidrug-Resistant Bacteria? A Review 
of U.S. Food and Drug Administration-Approved Antibiotics, 2010–2015, 165 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 363, 369–71 (2016) (noting disappointing development of new antibiotics). 
 228. Tropical Medicine Research Centers – Program Overview, NAT’L INST. ALLERGY & 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES, https://www.niaid.nih.gov/research/tmrc-program-overview 
[https://perma.cc/Q49Y-7W7L] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 229. Id. 
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both support useful research in these areas of unmet need and “build capacity 
to enable [the Centers] to conduct future clinical trials, implement new 
treatment and prevention strategies, and develop novel vector control 
strategies.”230 In other words, the NIH aims to use grant funding to establish 
the capacity for future useful work even after initial funding has ended.231 The 
Institute funds training to build research capacity, focusing on institutions in 
developing nations.232 
Grants are unlikely to fully solve any of these problems of inadequate 
demand. But they provide useful innovation tools. Outterson and Aaron 
Kesselheim recognize that grants can play a role, within a complex system of 
tailored incentives, in supporting underlying research to reduce the cost of 
developing new antibiotics.233 In a pleasant example of putting theory into 
practice, Outterson—in the years since he helped bring antibiotic resistance 
incentive problems to greater salience—has become the Executive Director of 
a $350-million grant-funded project aimed at increasing innovation in 
antibiotic development, including efforts that are too risky or paradigm-
challenging for private development, as well as relatively mainstream efforts 
that suffer from the incentive problems described above.234 
This type of grant-funding raises important questions: Who identifies 
underfunded innovations whose social value exceeds market value, and how? 
These questions may be especially challenging for applied research that does 
not obviously promote the same sorts of knowledge spillovers as basic 
research. Here, the first critique of grants—bureaucrats make funding 
decisions—has more bite.235 But that may be precisely the point. This type of 
social welfare problem—social value that exceeds market price signals—is 
exactly the type of problem that market actors with private knowledge are ill-
?
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See Funding Opportunity Announcement PAR-17-057: Global Infectious Disease Research 
Training Program (D43), NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-files/PAR-17-057.html 
https://perma.cc/27K8-J49U] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 233. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, Fighting Antibiotic Resistance: Marrying New 
Financial Incentives to Meeting Public Health Goals, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1689, 1694 (2010). Kesselheim 
and Outterson also respond to the risk allocation concern described supra, suggesting that 
“[f]or drugs that ultimately emerge from public investment programs, the government should 
receive an appropriate share of the enhanced reimbursement by payers.” Id. 
 234. See Kevin Outterson et al., Accelerating Global Innovation to Address Antibacterial 
Resistance: Introducing CARB-X, 15 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 589 (2016). 
 235. See supra Section II.B.1; cf. Abramowicz, supra note 50, at 1366–67 (arguing that 
orphan drug development should be subsidized only when they are inefficient and that 
government officials are likely unable to make that determination). 
2019] GRANTS 47 
?
suited to fix.236 The specialized knowledge of scientist peer reviewers might 
have more traction, but really, this is a problem about social welfare and 
identifying substantial unmet needs on a broader level. While the government 
(or philanthropic organizations) might do this inefficiently, it can make that 
social choice in a way that private firms won’t.237 
Even accepting that the government might be the right entity to make this 
sort of resource allocation call, how should it go about the task? Sachs argues 
that this sort of centralized decision-making is an opportunity for interagency 
collaboration to leverage different sources of knowledge and expertise.238 With 
respect to under-addressed diseases, she notes that the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) possess extensive information useful for NIH 
decisions on funding allocation, including on disease burdens; existing drugs; 
and, in combination, which diseases are currently underserved.239 
Unfortunately, such interagency collaboration is relatively underdeveloped,240 
but the collective expertise of CMS, the Centers for Disease Control, and other 
relevant agencies could help direct the funding allocation decisions of the NIH 
to address unmet biomedical needs with substantial potential social welfare 
gains. 
2. Appropriability Failures 
Grants can also pick up the incentive slack where markets value an 
innovation adequately, but firms cannot appropriate enough of its value to 
justify investment. The problem of appropriating the value of an information 
good is a fundamental justification for intellectual property. Ideally, intellectual 
property allows firms to appropriate social value of nonexclusive, nonrivalrous 
information goods by creating an exclusivity mechanism.241 But intellectual 
?
 236. In some cases, of course, no entity, whether private or public, will have a good answer 
as to the social value of a potential innovation. In such cases, whoever is making the decision 
must simply muddle through—as happens anyway. See, e.g., Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of 
“Muddling Through”, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959) (explaining the difficulty in determining 
the social value of a policy). 
 237. Cf. Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at 439–41 (proposing that the grant system issue 
calls for scientists to propose important cross-disciplinary problems that need to be solved). 
 238. Rachel E. Sachs, Administering Health Innovation, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1991, 1993–96 
(2018). 
 239. Id. at 2028. 
 240. See id. at 2038–41; see generally Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing Interdisciplinary 
Collaboration: The Oncofertility Consortium as an Emerging Knowledge Commons, in GOVERNING 
MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 259 (Kathy Strandburg, Brett Frischmann, & Michael 
Madison eds., 2017) (discussing failures in interagency collaboration in the context of the NIH 
Roadmap grants) [hereinafter Pedraza-Fariña, Oncofertility]. 
 241. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004) (discussing the different justifications that exist for having 
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property mechanisms don’t always work. Where they fail, grants can step in, 
even if the innovation is relatively late in the development pipeline.242 
To take one prominent example, medical diagnostics are a tough target for 
current patent law; grants could help. Diagnostics range from simple blood 
tests used in everyday care to the use of next-generation sequencing and 
complex multigene panels to pinpoint the cause of cancer. Often, the science 
underlying a diagnostic test is developed with grant funding. For instance, the 
Supreme Court’s 2012 case about diagnostic methods patents, Mayo v. 
Prometheus, turned on a relationship between the proper dosing of a drug and 
the amount of a drug-related metabolite in the patient’s blood.243 That 
relationship was identified through grant-funded research, though the Court 
did not note that.244 When the Court held in Mayo that the resulting diagnostic 
test was unpatentable as essentially stating a natural law (the underlying 
relationship) and telling doctors to “apply it,”245 scholars (including me) noted 
that this description could cover many diagnostic tests, and worried that 
patents would no longer provide adequate incentives for firms to develop 
diagnostic tests and bring them into the market and into clinical use.246 Some 
have suggested changing patent law to allay this concern.247 But grants may do 
the job without needing to change patent law.248 
Grants could support the process of bringing scientific relationships into 
use as diagnostic tests. For some diagnostics, not much needs to be done to 
go from relationship to test: once scientists identify genetic mutations 
associated with a disease (often using grant money), doctors can then identify 
?
exclusive intellectual property). 
 242. See Ouellette, supra note 22, at 1131–32, 1134–35, 1139. 
 243. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73–75 (2012) 
(describing diagnostic technology in question). 
 244. See Marla C. Dubinsky et al., Pharmacogenomics and Metabolite Measurement for 6-
Mercaptopurine Therapy in Inflammatory Bowel Disease, 118 GASTROENTEROLOGY 705, 713 (2000) 
(“Supported by the Charles Bruneau Foundation . . . Fonds de la Recherche en Santé du 
Québec . . . and Fonds pour la Formation de Chercheurs et l’Aide à la Recherche . . . .”). 
 245. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73. 
 246. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 21; Sachs, supra note 21; W. Nicholson Price II, Big 
Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1425–26 (2016). 
 247. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Peter S. Menell & David O. Taylor, Final Report of the 
Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Section 101 Workshop: Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, 
33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551 (2018) (outlining a workshop aimed at changing aspects of patent 
law). 
 248. Changing patent law back to a pre-Mayo state would bring its own complications. See, 
e.g., Price, supra note 246, at 1444–45 (briefly discussing these problems and citing more in-
depth analyses). At a minimum, the Supreme Court seems uninterested in this possibility, 
having reaffirmed Mayo in Alice; change would require Congressional action.  
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the mutation after obtaining the patient’s genetic sequence.249 In those cases, 
additional grants may not even be needed. If more research needs to be 
done—exploring how well existing assays measure the relationship, whether 
the relationship accurately predicts status in various groups, and whether 
measurements can be used to improve clinical outcomes—grants can support 
this work without relying on patent incentives. And where doctors need new 
technology to apply newly discovered scientific relationships, patent law can 
still provide the market-calibrated incentives it does for other biomedical 
technologies—but focused on the technology, not the underlying relationship. 
For diagnostics, then, grants can support intermediate-cost technologies where 
some incentive is needed but other incentives are unavailable. 
* * * 
Grants are not unique in their ability to create incentives for innovation 
where social value exceeds appropriable market value. Prizes, in particular, can 
also provide incentives for such innovation, because they typically do not rely 
on exclusivity or matching market demand.250 Indeed, prizes may work better 
in some circumstances where parallel effort between many research teams is 
demanded,251 though they do not particularly help capital constrained firms.252 
R&D tax credits also create incentives for innovation where social value 
exceeds appropriable market value, though they do so by reducing innovation 
costs across the board rather than by targeting particular areas of likely social 
benefit. The point is not that grants are the only mechanism that can create 
incentives to solve this type of innovation problem, but that grants are a useful 
tool in this area, and that they use a different set of decision processes to create 
incentives. Grants are unique, however, in a different area. 
?
 249. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (describing role of DNA testing in diagnostics). In a parallel to Mayo, the 
Supreme Court held in Myriad that unaltered genomic DNA is unpatentable, making simple 
genetic tests of the “here’s an important mutation; find it to diagnose a problem” variety 
similarly unpatentable. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 
576, 580 (2013) (holding that “a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and 
not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated”). Today, doctors don’t typically 
interpret genetic results on their own—genetic counselors act as intermediaries to interpret 
genetic testing results. A business model could rely on providing that intermediary service. Cf. 
Rachel E. Sachs, Divided Infringement and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, IP THEORY (forthcoming) 
(noting the difficulty of enforcing diagnostic methods patents in models with such 
intermediaries). But there is nothing to stop information about well-characterized mutations 
from becoming as routinely interpreted as, for instance, high cholesterol levels, once genetic 
sequencing becomes more common. 
 250. See Adler, supra note 16, at 12–13. 
 251. Id. at 13–14. 
 252. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 2, at 336. 
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B.? INNOVATION ENABLERS  
Grants can support the people, institutions, processes, and infrastructure 
that enable innovation and shape its direction. Let me unpack that through a 
comparison with other innovation incentives. Patents focus on particular 
inventions: a patent protects the invention itself from appropriation by 
someone other than the patentee. Similarly, prizes address a particular product 
or outcome, like creating an accurate clock, finding a way to preserve food for 
a long period of time, creating a reusable vehicle for space flight, or the like.253 
Trade secrecy protects information, whether that be a way of manufacturing a 
challenging drug or a carefully assembled list of potential customers.254 Each 
of these creates an incentive to develop the thing, the product, the output—
and the rest of the innovation process is shaped around that incentive. Grants 
are different. They can focus on particular projects; indeed, many do. But grants 
can also fund individuals directly, allowing that individual to innovate in 
whatever way she sees best, whether that be toward a commercially viable 
product, basic knowledge production, or a set of several linked possibilities. 
Grants can aim squarely to build institutions, supporting centers or networks 
that can then pursue their own institutional research and innovation goals. 
They can shape innovation processes and build resources that enable fields to 
move forward. In this flexibility of focus, grants diverge sharply from patents, 
trade secrets, and prizes.255 This Section describes four potential grant targets 
besides projects themselves: people, institutions, processes, and infrastructural 
datasets. 
?
 253. See, e.g., LONGITUDE PRIZE, https://longitudeprize.org/ [https://perma.cc/HL7C-
YKN7] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (detailing the Longitude Prize, originally for ship navigation 
but currently for overcoming antibiotic resistance); Stephen Schaber, Why Napoleon Offered a 
Prize for Inventing Canned Food, NPR (Mar. 1, 2012) https://www.npr.org/sections/
money/2012/03/01/147751097/why-napoleon-offered-a-prize-for-inventing-canned-food 
[https://perma.cc/LTE5-H9X4] (describing Napoleon’s 1795 prize for improvement of food 
preservation methods); Tina Rosenberg, Prizes with an Eye Toward the Future, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
29, 2012), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/29/prizes-with-an-eye-toward-
the-future/ [https://perma.cc/S8LZ-JY32] (noting the X Prize for private spaceflight); see 
generally Michael J. Burstein & Fiona E. Murray, Innovation Prizes in Practice and Theory, 29 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 401, 402–06 (2016) (describing the use of innovation prizes in general, including 
Longitude Prize and X Prize). 
 254. See W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition 
and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1044–45 (2016) (explaining trade secrecy in relation to 
biologics manufacturing); see also Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret 
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1805–06 (2014) (describing trade secret doctrine). 
 255. Inasmuch as tax incentives create fungible incentives for any type of research 
undertaken by an entity which would otherwise owe income taxes, they function as an entity-
targeted incentive rather than an outcome-focused incentive. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra 
note 2, at 321–26. 
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1. People 
Two types of people might merit particular focus in terms of funding 
innovation: the exceptional and the young. Orthogonally, grants can support 
individuals either directly, without regard to project, or by weighing individual 
characteristics in addition to project merit. 
a)? The Exceptional and the Young 
Why focus on exceptional individuals and the young? For the first, we 
might find it worthwhile to target truly exceptional individuals for grant 
support. That is, if we can identify the best scientists, we might judge them 
particularly good targets for grant funding because we think their projects are 
likely to be particularly influential.256 We might also think them likely to 
produce, on average, more good ideas than other researchers; helping them 
pursue those projects rather than struggle for funding would increase social 
benefits.257 
Separately, we might benefit from targeting younger scientists for grant 
support. Freeman and Van Reenen point to three reasons that younger 
scientists should be particular targets of grant funding: (1) in many fields, 
especially highly technical fields, researchers do their best work when they are 
relatively young, (2) providing funding early in a young scientist’s career 
increases the odds that she will continue to pursue science, and (3) funding for 
scientists is among other things an investment in human capital.258 All things 
being equal, a younger scientist has more time left in her career to use that 
capital (and to produce social benefits from that investment) than an older 
scientist.259 Grant support is crucial to the careers of young scientists; as 
McGarity describes it, “[y]ounger scientists at prestigious institutions have no 
hope of becoming tenured if they do not have at least one NIH or NSF 
grant.”260 
?
 256. See Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 209, at 17–18 (describing the need to identify 
the most creative individuals), 22–23 (arguing that researchers with the most fertile minds will 
self-select into the grant system). 
 257. Id. at 23–24. 
 258. For empirical evidence that human capital investments are more important to 
innovation than physical capital investments, see Fabian Waldinger, Bombs, Brains, and Science: 
The Role of Human and Physical Capital for the Creation of Scientific Knowledge, 98 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 811, 811 (2016). 
 259. Freeman & Van Reenen, supra note 91, at 22–23. 
 260. McGarity, supra note 91, at 65 (“Denying a grant to a more established researcher 
can close his or her laboratory and effectively end his or her career as a productive 
researcher.”); see Freeman & Van Reenan, supra note 91, at 19. Of course, grants are also 
important to later researchers.  
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Unfortunately, the current reality is that younger scientists have a hard time 
getting grant funding. The average age at which a PhD scientist gets her first 
R01 grant has been around 42 for several years; in 1980 it was 36.8.261 Freeman 
and Van Reenen calculate that younger scientists have approximately tenfold 
worse chances of winning an R01 grant than scientists over 45.262 This fact has 
worried scientists and policymakers, leading to policy changes including the 
mechanisms described in the next Section.263 
b)? Person-Focusing and Project-Weighting 
A preference for a particular type of individual in grant funding can be 
implemented in at least two ways. First, grants can fund an individual separate 
from any project, to enable her to innovate, or to train her and therefore 
increase her human capital. Second, grant funding decisions can still focus on 
projects, but can heavily weight particular researcher characteristics. 
Table 1: Examples of Grants Targeting People 
 Person-focused 
Project preference 
 Training Enabling 
Exceptional n/a HHMI, 
MacArthur 
Implicit advantage 
Young F31, F32 n/a ESI rules 
 
Some individual-targeted grants focus entirely on enabling innovation by 
the individual. Training grants are common and aim to increase the expertise 
and human capital of the funded individual. The NIH offers several types of 
training grants, such as the F31 grant for supervised research training of 
doctoral candidates, the F32 grant for postdoctoral fellows “to broaden their 
scientific background and extend their potential for research,” and the F33 
Senior Fellow grant to help “experienced scientists to make major changes in 
the direction of research careers, or to acquire new research capabilities.”264 
These grants are “training awards and not research awards.”265 They do not 
?
 261. See Average Age and Degree of NIH R01-Equivalent First-Time Awardees Fiscal Years 1980-
2016, NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/new_investigators/Average_age_initial_R01.xls 
[https://perma.cc/63JU-9FNY] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 262. Freeman & Van Reenen, supra note 91, at 21. 
 263. See, e.g., Ronald J. Daniels, A Generation at Risk: Young Investigators and the Future of the 
Biomedical Workforce, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 313 (2015) (describing the effects of 
declining research grants to young researchers to the biomedical industry). 
 264. Individual Fellowships, NIH, https://researchtraining.nih.gov/programs/fellowships 
[https://perma.cc/GS28-HBB4] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 265. NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 70, at IIB-37. 
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focus on the project, but rather the candidate’s potential and need for training 
as well as how the proposed training, sponsor, and environment will address 
that need.266 The K series grants similarly serve career development goals.267 
This group of grants focuses entirely on individuals and on enabling future 
innovation by building human capital.268 
A different type of individual-enabling grant simply provides resources and 
an open mandate to an exceptional individual. The reasoning is that 
exceptional individuals, given freedom and resources, will tackle hard, risky 
problems and may produce exceptional results.269 The NIH doesn’t focus on 
this type of award, but other funders sometimes do. The Howard Hughes 
Medical Institute is perhaps the most substantial such funder and the 
MacArthur Foundation the closest follower of an individual-focused model. 
Howard Hughes, with the motto “People, Not Projects,” identifies 
outstanding biomedical innovators, selects them as Howard Hughes Medical 
Investigators (currently there are around 300), and provides them with 
substantial funding—around $1 million per year—for renewable seven-year 
terms.270 Howard Hughes aims to give “our scientists the time and freedom to 
pursue difficult, long-range questions,”271 and at least some evidence suggests 
that this strategy works.272 The MacArthur Foundation provides even purer 
grant funding to exceptional individuals, commonly known as Genius Grants. 
?
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at IIB-80 (e.g., K01 grants for advanced research training and additional 
experience). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Patents can also highly reward the exceptional scientist, of course, but that depends 
on the research creating appropriable rewards; prizes depend on post-hoc recognition and 
typically do not provide funds to support research going forward. 
 270. See Fast Facts, HOWARD HUGHES MED. INST., https://www.hhmi.org/press-
room/fast-facts [https://perma.cc/A3WS-F2EZ] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (noting 292 
current HHMI investigators); HHMI Bets Big on 19 New Investigators, HOWARD HUGHES MED. 
INST., https://www.hhmi.org/news/hhmi-bets-big-on-19-new-investigators 
[https://perma.cc/TAU3-UQ58] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (noting approximately $8 million 
in grants over a seven-year term for each Investigator). Technically, the researchers become 
HHMI employees, suggesting something more like a patronage model than classical grant 
funding. See Our Scientists, HOWARD HUGHES MED. INST., http://www.hhmi.org/scientists 
[https://perma.cc/DSS8-9J7C] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). But they remain at their home 
institutions and retain their home appointments, and receive substantial funding to continue 
research in that context, making the appointment look very much like a person-focused grant. 
Id. 
 271. Biomedical Research Programs, HOWARD HUGHES MED. INST., http://www.hhmi.org/
programs/biomedical-research [https://perma.cc/5E8M-7Y9H] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 272. See Azoulay, Zivin & Manso, supra note 202, at 528–29 (noting substantial differences 
in funding mechanisms and finding that Howard Hughes Medical Investigators produced 
more high-impact publications than NIH-funded scientists with similar accomplishments). 
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It provides “$625,000, no-strings-attached” five-year grants based on 
“[e]xceptional creativity” and the potential for substantial future work.273 The 
Foundation “does not require or expect specific products or reports” from 
recipients.274 
A different approach prioritizes projects by taking into account the 
characteristics of the individual researchers. The clearest example of this 
explicit prioritization comes in the NIH’s special rules for grant applications 
by New and Early Stage Investigators—respectively, those who have not yet 
won a major research award and those within ten years of finishing their 
terminal degree.275 For several years, the NIH has tried to reduce the age at 
which young scientists win their first major grants. The NIH clusters grant 
applications from New Investigators in peer review, so it can compare 
researchers with similar experience.276 At least half of researchers receiving 
their first R01 or equivalent grant must be within ten years of finishing their 
terminal degree.277 Finally, NIH Institutes make funding decisions aimed to 
achieve similar success rates for new grant applications by New Investigators 
and established investigators.278 For instance, the National Cancer Institute’s 
2016 funding policy funded grants to the 10th percentile for established 
investigators but the 12th percentile for Early Stage Investigators—effectively 
putting a thumb on the scale for young researchers.279 These policies generally 
reflect the goal of providing funding to younger scientists to invest in their 
futures—a goal that grants are uniquely suited to advance.280 
?
 273. About MacArthur Fellows Program, MACARTHUR FOUND., 
https://www.macfound.org/programs/fellows/strategy/ [https://perma.cc/6L9N-L5BF] 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 274. Id.  
 275. Early Stage Investigator Policies, NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/policy/new_
investigators/index.htm [https://perma.cc/3HFY-DTL7] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). For 
researchers who are medical doctors, Early Stage Investigators are those within ten years of 
finishing their medical residency. See id. To the best of my knowledge, no similar program 
exists for exceptional individuals—but exceptional researchers would be expected to submit 
exceptional grant applications in any case, and so should have an implicit advantage anyway. 
 276. See id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. See id. 
 279. NCI, 2016 Funding Strategy, supra note 146. The NIH Director also has a set of grants 
to support extraordinary individuals, some of which, like the DP1 NIH Director’s Pioneer 
Award, are specifically targeted at exceptional young researchers Grants. See Types of Grant 
Programs, NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/funding_program.htm 
[https://perma.cc/TZ3T-BDWV] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) [hereinafter NIH, Activity Codes] 
(providing overview of NIH Activity Codes). 
 280. Some prizes are explicitly targeted at the young, such as the Fields medal or the John 
Bates Clark medal, rewarded to outstanding mathematicians and economists, respectively, 
2019] GRANTS 55 
?
1. Institutions 
Grants can also target broader innovative entities, providing funding to 
institutions to enable future innovation. NIH grants typically fund research 
within a laboratory environment, whether in an academic institution, a 
hospital, or private industry. And indeed, NIH support for labs is critical; 
grants provide support for equipment, salaries, and research supplies, and are 
especially important in capital-constrained environments.281 This ability of 
grants to purchase the equipment necessary for research has even been raised 
as a justification for the historical move from a prize-based to a grant-based 
innovation system.282 More broadly, grants can enable the creation of new 
institutions, support the efforts of existing institutions, or allow existing 
institutions to increase their capacity. Similar to the focus on exceptional 
individuals described above, the NIH can identify institutions that are likely to 
be especially productive and help them increase their capabilities. 
The NIH provides many grants specifically targeted at increasing 
institutional capabilities. The G11 grant helps institutions improve their 
research infrastructure by providing funds for them to establish an office of 
sponsored research to work with grant funders.283 M01 grants support 
“General Clinical Research Center[s] where scientists conduct studies on a 
wide range of human diseases using the full spectrum of the biomedical 
science,” and can fund renovation, staff salaries, equipment, and supplies.284 
P01 grants support research programs, P30 grants support administrative cores 
for centers, P51 grants support primate research colonies, and P60 grants 
support comprehensive centers—the list goes on.285 Suffice it to say, the NIH 
can and does target institutions, centers, and programs of different sizes and 
foci, all to further the goal of enabling innovation by those best suited to 
innovate. As with focusing on individuals, this institution-supporting role is 
essentially unique to grants. 
?
under the age of forty. Fields Medal, INT’L MATHEMATICAL UNION, https://www.math
union.org/imu-awards/fields-medal [https://perma.cc/4VSW-EWA4] (last visited Mar. 11, 
2019); John Bates Clark Medal, AM. ECON. ASS’N, https://www.aeaweb.org/about-aea/honors-
awards/bates-clark [https://perma.cc/5LG3-DQU4] (last visited July 2, 2017). However, 
such prizes generally do not provide substantial funds for either training or research going 
forward. 
 281. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 2, at 334–38. 
 282. See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 52, at 7–8. 
 283. See NIH, Activity Codes, supra note 279 (G11 grant description available from 
dropdown list). 
 284. Id. (M11 grant description available from dropdown list). 
 285. Id. 
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2. Processes 
Grants can influence the processes through which innovation takes place; 
in particular, they can create incentives for collaboration and interdisciplinary 
work. Again, this focus differs from other incentives; patents, prizes, and tax 
R&D incentives tend not to take account of innovation environment. 
Collaboration may impact the value of these rewards—joint inventorship 
changes the control mechanisms for patents, and of course joint creation splits 
the reward of any of these mechanisms—but other policy levers do not 
specifically encourage collaboration.286 Grants, by contrast, can and do. 
Grants can generally target collaborative work where researchers from 
different labs or institutions work together on a funded project. 
Encouragement can be explicit, such as requirements that recipients participate 
in collaborative research networks.287 Elias Zerhouni, the Director of the NIH, 
launched the 2002 Roadmap for Medical Research Initiative specifically to 
encourage and fund collaborative team science.288 Grants may also implicitly 
encourage collaboration by preferentially funding projects that require 
collaborative work.289 
An important subset of process-focused grants promotes interdisciplinary 
work. Boundary-crossing work can push forward the frontiers of science and 
innovation.290 However, interdisciplinary work is hard; it is challenging to 
master multiple disciplines or to reach across disciplinary lines, and 
interdisciplinary researchers may encounter resistance from peers and 
scientific institutions.291 Such work is also “high-risk, high-reward,” suggesting 
?
 286. See Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the 
Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2001 (2011) (“Problematically, the laws 
of joint authorship and joint inventorship in intellectual property actually dissuade certain 
collaboration.”). 
 287. Interview with Anonymous Senior Scientist (June 7, 2017) (on file with author) 
(describing grant requirement that recipients participate in a research network and noting that 
it led to productive collaborative work). 
 288. See generally Elias A. Zerhouni, The NIH Roadmap, 302 SCIENCE 63 (2003). 
 289. See Robin Barr, R01 Teams and Grantee Age Trends in Grant Funding, NIH NAT’L INST. 
ON AGING (April 22, 2015), https://www.nia.nih.gov/research/blog/2015/04/r01-teams-
and-grantee-age-trends-grant-funding [https://perma.cc/F7JB-6EWL] (noting that the modal 
top-scoring R01 grant in 2005 had one principal investigator; in 2015 it had four). 
 290. See JULIE THOMPSON KLEIN, INTERDISCIPLINARITY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND 
PRACTICE 12 (1990); Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at 439–41; see also Michal Shur-Ofry, 
Connect the Dots: Patents and Interdisciplinarity, 51 MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 62–65 (2017). 
 291. See Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at 423–24 (discussing social barriers to 
interdisciplinary innovation). There is a rich literature outside law on interdisciplinarity. See, 
e.g., Susan Leigh Star & James R. Griesemer, Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Boundary 
Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39, 19 SOCIAL 
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that innovation incentives are likely to be useful in promoting investment. 
Unfortunately, patents aren’t especially good at promoting interdisciplinary 
work; Michal Shur-Ofry writes that patent law generally regards 
interdisciplinary combinations “not as a potential source of groundbreaking 
innovation, but at most, as an excusable flaw.”292 
Grants, on the other hand, can directly target and facilitate interdisciplinary 
work.293 Laura Pedraza-Fariña examines an NIH grant program that aimed 
squarely at interdisciplinary work.294 She focuses on one part of Zerhouni’s 
Roadmap, the Interdisciplinary Research Consortia grants, which funded nine 
interdisciplinary consortia between 2005 and 2012.295 Pedraza-Fariña recounts 
the formation of the Oncofertility Consortium, a network of researchers 
focused on solving the problem of oncofertility—that is, how can we ensure 
that cancer patients can still have children after their treatment?296 Oncofertility 
is a knotty scientific problem, and a tough interdisciplinary one: oncologists, 
reproductive endocrinologists, and basic research scientists have substantially 
different approaches and areas of expertise.297 Pedraza-Fariña describes how 
the grant program, which specifically called for interdisciplinary applications, 
served as a “catalyst to collaboration—providing short-term, seed funding to 
enable cross-disciplinary collaboration.”298 It did so by combining several 
different grant types, including some types described above: a U54 
?
STUD. SCI 387 (1989) (coining the term “boundary object”); TRADING ZONES AND 
INTERACTIONAL EXPERTISE: CREATING NEW KINDS OF COLLABORATION (Michael E. 
Gorman ed., 2010) (discussing framework for fostering interdisciplinary collaborations). 
 292. Shur-Ofry, supra note 290, at 72; see Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at 436–38 (arguing 
that patent doctrine is actively hostile to interdisciplinary innovation and suggesting 
modifications); Mandel, supra note 286; Jacob S. Sherkow, Negativing Invention, 2011 BYU L. 
REV. 1091, 1094–95 (2011) (noting that interdisciplinary combinations are less susceptible to 
“analogous arts,” and have the effect of “negativing” inventions). 
 293. See Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at 442 (“[G]overnment grants or prizes can be 
structured to incentivize the identification of problems whose solution requires the combined 
expertise from multiple disciplines and subdisciplines.”). Note that collaboration and 
interdisciplinarity are not targets only of NIH grants, nor indeed only of federal grants; they 
can be targeted by any grant funder. See, e.g., MCubed, UNIV. MICH., supra note 83 (noting that 
funding will be provided only to teams of at least three faculty researchers from at least two 
different campus units). 
 294. See generally Pedraza-Fariña, Oncofertility, supra note 240. 
 295. Id. at 260 (citing Interdisciplinary Program Snapshot, NIH, https://common
fund.nih.gov/Interdisciplinary [https://perma.cc/8U8V-JJ28]). Because obtaining cross-
disciplinary grants from individual disease-focused NIH Institutes is hard, the broader 
Interdisciplinary Research program was funded by the Common Fund, a central pool of 
money used for larger strategic NIH initiatives. Id. 
 296. Id. at 260. 
 297. Id. at 260–61. 
 298. Id. at 261. 
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Cooperative Agreement for a specialized center to support a centralized 
administrative core to organize and coordinate the team,299 four R01 Research 
Project grants to support basic research into female follicles,300 two P30 Center 
Core grants to fund a core for maintaining and distributing patient samples 
and other materials and to fund the National Physician’s Cooperative (the 
network of participants), an R25 Education Project grant to fund an 
“educational module,” and three different grants (a T90 Interdisciplinary 
Research Training Award, an R90 Interdisciplinary Regular Research Training 
Award, and a K01 Research Scientist Development Award - Research & 
Training) to fund training for oncofertility specialists.301 The Interdisciplinary 
Research Consortia program leveraged several different grant regimes with the 
goal of not only supporting interdisciplinary collaboration, but also of 
catalyzing something that would last long-term. In short, the grant program 
tried to use a jolt of focused funding to create something novel and sustainable. 
And it worked. As Pedraza-Fariña documents, the Oncofertility 
Consortium developed specifically in response to the Interdisciplinary 
Research Consortia program’s call for applications. Although the scientists 
involved knew each other, “none of them . . . had embarked on a collaboration 
of this magnitude, nor held a focused discussion on how to address fertility 
preservation questions in a concerted manner prior to applying for the 
oncofertility consortium grant.”302 Although the Interdisciplinary Research 
Consortia program ended in 2012, the Oncofertility Consortium continues 
today.303 In addition, the Consortium has built infrastructure that can be used 
going forward and has spawned other ongoing collaborations.304 
The Oncofertility Consortium was not the only interdisciplinary 
consortium funded by the NIH’s program. The program also funded consortia 
focused on the molecular mechanisms of stress; the science of aging with a 
focus on cancer, organ design and engineering; and obesity and metabolic 
disorders, among others.305 At least some are still active today.306 And as 
?
 299. Id. at 280. 
 300. Id. at 262 n.20. 
 301. Id. at 280. 
 302. Id. at 275. 
 303. THE ONCOFERTILITY CONSORTIUM, http://oncofertility.northwestern.edu/ 
[https://perma.cc/B493-SUKY] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 304. Pedraza-Fariña, Oncofertility, supra note 240, at 283. 
 305. See Interdisciplinary Research Consortia, NIH, https://commonfund.nih.gov/
Interdisciplinary/consortia [https://perma.cc/FM58-MWH3] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 306. In comparison with the still-vital Oncofertility Consortium, see, for example, 
Taskforce for Obesity Research at UT Southwestern (TORS), U.T. SOUTHWESTERN, 
https://www.utsouthwestern.edu/education/medical-school/departments/center-human-
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Pedraza-Fariña points out, overcoming initial hurdles to collaboration may be 
much of the battle; even if particular consortia end, the possibility of 
interdisciplinary collaboration remains easier after the initial structural work 
has been done—work that grants can specifically target and support.307 
3. Infrastructure 
Finally, grants can specifically target infrastructural goods to create broad 
support for future innovation. Brett Frischmann characterizes infrastructural 
goods by three key traits: (1) they “may be consumed nonrivalrously for some 
appreciable range of demand”; (2) they are valuable largely because they are 
inputs into downstream productive activities; and (3) such activities may 
produce a wide range of goods, including public goods, social goods, and 
private goods.308 Infrastructural goods are socially valuable because they enable 
a broad range of activities and have many spillovers; they are public goods and 
enable others to generate public goods.309 But that’s why the incentives to 
invest in infrastructural goods tend to be too low. On the supply side, it is hard 
for infrastructure investors to appropriate the full social benefits of their 
investment: infrastructure has spillover benefits that are hard to capture.310 
And on the demand side, even if infrastructure investors could appropriate all 
the private demand for the infrastructural good, users are unlikely to be willing 
to pay the full social value for access to the infrastructure, because they may be 
creating public goods whose benefits they cannot appropriate.311 All of which 
is to say: infrastructural goods have substantial social benefits, but it is rare for 
private entities to have the right incentives to either create the infrastructure 
in the first place or allow broad enough, cheap enough use that downstream 
users create the largest social value.312 
Enter grants. The government can get involved to help overcome the 
challenges with private incentives for infrastructure.313 Sometimes that is direct 
construction; for example, the federal government built and runs the interstate 
highway system.314 Sometimes not; grants can provide a powerful way to 
?
nutrition/obesity-alliance.html [https://perma.cc/LF23-VR2X] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) 
(showing no publications after 2012 and no conference meetings after 2014). 
 307. Pedraza-Fariña, Oncofertility, supra note 240, at 283–84. 
 308. BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED 
RESOURCES 61–62 (2013). 
 309. Id. at 68–69. 
 310. Id. at 14–15. 
 311. Id. at 71–72. 
 312. See id. at 98. 
 313. Id. at 14–15. 
 314. Id. at 189–90. 
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leverage non-governmental expertise in large, infrastructural projects designed 
to create resources that will broadly enable future scientific endeavors.315 These 
projects tend to be motivated by the centralized belief—held by both 
administrators and scientists—that the infrastructure project will create 
substantial social value. Prominent NIH programs have thus used grants to 
drive large-scale scientific infrastructure projects and to make their fruits 
broadly available.316 
The Human Genome Project, which started at the end of the 20th century, 
is a key example.317 The Project was a massive undertaking that aimed to 
sequence the entire human genome.318 The explicit goal of the project was to 
create infrastructure for future research, “to provide researchers with powerful 
tools to understand the genetic factors in human disease, paving the way for 
new strategies for their diagnosis, treatment and prevention.”319 Liscow and 
Karpilow highlight the potential for government spending to shift the course 
of future innovation: where legacy technologies (in their example, high-
pollution fossil fuel technology) benefit from a large existing stock of 
knowledge, concentrated government efforts to support knowledge 
generation in a new technology can shift future innovation in a socially 
desirable direction.320 
The Human Genome Project followed this pattern, creating benefits 
beside the genome map itself. The production of a human genome sequence 
enabled a large set of downstream uses, including developments in 
pharmacogenomics and genetic testing.321 It helped shift innovation away from 
?
 315. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Leviathan in the Commons: Biomedical Data and the State, 
in GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 19 (Kathy J. Strandburg, Brett M. 
Frischmann & Michael J. Madison eds., 2017) (describing the ways government actors shape 
biomedical data resources beyond merely supporting their creation). 
 316. See Jorge L. Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy: Policy, Patents, and the Design of the Genome 
Commons, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61 (2011) (describing the evolution of data release 
policies for genomic data starting with the 1996 Bermuda Principles); Jorge L. Contreras, 
Constructing the Genome Commons, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 99, 102 (Brett M. 
Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Kathy J. Strandburg eds., 2014) (describing genomic data 
as a commons with a “unique polycentric governance institution”). 
 317. See HILGARTNER, supra note 174 (describing the history of the Genome Project, 
focusing on the creation and change of knowledge-control regimes).  
 318. Of course, there is no one human genome; almost everyone’s is different. The Project 
aimed to generate a generalized consensus sequence upon which variations could be mapped. 
 319. NIH, FACT SHEET: HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 1 (Oct. 2010), 
https://report.nih.gov/NIHfactsheets/Pdfs/HumanGenomeProject(NHGRI).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NY3D-2XEQ] [hereinafter NIH, FACT SHEET]. 
 320. Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 51, at 392–93. 
 321. See NIH, FACT SHEET, supra note 319 (noting thousands of disease genes discovered, 
thousands of new genetic tests, hundreds of biotechnology products in clinical trials, and 
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the use of inexact or problematic proxies, like using race as a proxy for 
unmeasured genetic traits, and toward more direct genetic diagnostics.322 The 
Human Genome Project also created a guaranteed demand for technological 
advances that otherwise might be too risky, including novel genetic sequencing 
technology.323 The project explicitly sought to develop technology and 
information infrastructure, eventually leading to lower costs despite the initial 
outlay.324 
A private effort to sequence the human genome, Celera Genomics, 
illustrates the role of the government in such infrastructure projects. Celera 
Genomics entered the fray several years after the Human Genome Project 
began, aiming to complete its sequence much faster than the publicly funded 
effort.325 But Celera Genomics’ own effort—while impressive, fast, and 
generating and leveraging its own technological advances—itself relied 
substantially on publicly funded sequence data infrastructure resources.326 
According to Steven Hilgartner’s history of the Human Genome Project, 
approximately 60% of the completed sequence shared in Celera’s Science 
paper was in fact downloaded from the Human Genome Project’s publicly 
available dataset.327 The differences between the two projects also illuminate 
the benefits of publicly funded, relatively open management of infrastructural 
resources.328 The publicly funded effort helped develop the technology that 
supported the private effort—which then developed its own tremendously 
useful technology and created an important comparator sequence.329 But even 
once both sequences existed, Celera’s management of its own sequence as a 
private resource with paid access limited the sequence’s uses to those with the 
resources to pay, and, likely, to a subset of uses with more potential for 
immediate commercial gain rather than basic research or other projects with 
?
ongoing enabled scientific research). 
 322. See W. Nicholson Price II, Note, Patenting Race: The Problems of Ethnic Genetic Testing 
Patents, 8 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 119, 134–37 (2007). 
 323. Cf. Glennerster, Kremer & Williams, supra note 57, passim (describing advance 
purchase commitments as a mechanism to create incentives for firms to develop vaccines that 
otherwise might be too risky to draw enough investment).  
 324. See HILGARTNER, supra note 174, at 50. 
 325. Id. at 206–10. 
 326. Id. at 221. 
 327. Id.  
 328. See supra notes 308–313 and accompanying text. 
 329. See Int’l Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, Initial Sequencing and Analysis of the 
Human Genome, 409 NATURE 860 (2001) (announcing the Human Genome Project’s 
completed sequence); see also J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human Genome, 291 
SCIENCE 1304 (2001) (announcing Celera’s completed sequence). 
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greater spillovers.330 
Today, grants can help develop precision medicine and complex 
algorithms based on medical big data. The Precision Medicine Initiative aims 
to advance our knowledge of precision medicine, providing “the right 
treatments to the right patients at the right time.”331 It does this by supporting 
basic scientific research along these lines and also by partnering with many 
institutions to gather extensive genetic and health information, as well as 
biospecimens, on over one million volunteers—the “All of Us” cohort—as an 
infrastructural resource for future innovation.332 As Sachs notes, such large 
infrastructural initiatives can also focus other stakeholder efforts; the Precision 
Medicine Initiative has stimulated non-governmental investors to commit over 
$200 million.333 
A step further in the future, complex medical algorithms have the potential 
for tremendous benefits to the health care system, including improving patient 
care, optimizing resource allocation, suggesting new possibilities for treatment, 
and identifying problems or unknown benefits of existing drugs.334 But current 
innovation incentives are problematic. Patents are often unavailable, and 
relying on secrecy for databases or algorithms creates an array of problems.335 
In addition, market signals of demand may substantially underrepresent social 
value, particularly for the collection and use of data for underserved 
populations, including poor and minority populations.336 NIH grants could 
support the development of infrastructure, focusing on assembling and 
curating data, especially for underserved populations, and making it broadly 
?
 330. HILGARTNER, supra note 174, at 212–13. 
 331. See Precision Medicine, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
medicaldevices/productsandmedicalprocedures/invitrodiagnostics/precisionmedicine-
medicaldevices/default.htm [https://perma.cc/9ZMZ-GK2E] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 332. Scientific Opportunities, NIH, https://allofus.nih.gov/about/scientific-opportunities 
[https://perma.cc/H7EX-6V6A] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (“The program will set the 
foundation for new ways of engaging research participants, sharing health data and 
information, and employing technology advances to mine the information for comprehensive 
results.”); see Awardees, NIH, https://allofus.nih.gov/funding/awardees [https://perma.cc/
PA8E-TZNW] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (noting award of a U24 Cooperative Agreement to 
the Mayo Clinic to host a specimen biobank). 
 333. Sachs, supra note 238, at 2002 (citing Press Release, White House, FACT SHEET: 
Obama Administration Announces Key Actions to Accelerate Precision Medicine Initiative 
(Feb. 25, 2016)). 
 334. W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 434–37 (2015) 
(discussing “black-box medicine” and the use of opaque computational models to make 
decisions related to health care). 
 335. Price, supra note 246, at 1419–36. 
 336. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
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available to the research community.337 The “All of Us” cohort provides a start, 
but the NIH could go even further, broadening the reach of potential data, 
populations included, and research analyses supported. 
V.? CONCLUSION 
Grants are a useful tool in the innovation toolbox. Although there is some 
truth to common critiques—bureaucrats are involved in decisions, individual 
grants are indeed ex ante funding with relatively low accountability, and the 
government doesn’t profit directly from grant-funded research—the reality is 
much more complex, and the critiques mask this complexity. Funding 
decisions are largely made by scientists based on scientific merit, the repeat-
player nature of grants creates accountability, and the government and society 
reap substantial indirect benefits from grants whether they succeed or fail. 
Moreover, the grant application process and the peer review process bring 
considerable information and expertise to bear on government choices about 
what projects to fund. 
While I am enthusiastic about what the grant system has to offer, I do not 
mean to suggest, a naïve Pollyanna, that the system is wrinkle-free. The three 
critiques have some truth to them and the system has other problems. The 
system of repeat players can privilege experience and erect barriers to entry for 
new innovators, especially innovators who do not tread the typical path.338 
Seeking grants can consume inordinate amount of a researcher’s time and 
energy;339 postdoctoral fellows can be trapped in fellowships or chased from 
science by the unavailability of grants.340 And the hunt for scarce money can 
warp research priorities despite the best efforts of funders and peer reviewers. 
Grants are not perfect. 
Nevertheless, the overall system, the aggregation of scientific knowledge 
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and priorities—with input from the government as to social benefit—is not 
inferior to determinations that arise from private market aggregation of private 
knowledge; it’s just different. The grant system has its own flaws and foibles, 
but also, importantly, presents an alternative decision-making process that 
avoids the flaws and foibles of the market-dominated systems of other 
innovation levers. If our only goal is the cheapest development of drugs for 
the wealthy, then we can probably rely only on market mechanisms to allocate 
innovation and do just fine. But if we care more broadly about the formation 
of new scientific fields before the promise of obvious commercial profits, the 
development of drugs for the poor, the creation of difficult-to-exclude 
knowledge, the nourishment of mobile young scientists, the creation of 
interdisciplinary networks, or the pursuit of other goals that the market and 
private knowledge can neither appropriately value nor staff, then grants 
provide an attractive set of policy options. Grants are not the only way to 
pursue these goals, but they use a different way of gathering information and 
allocating resources that make such pursuits more straightforward. 
A complete understanding of the role of grants in the innovation 
ecosystem demands more study, both theoretical and empirical. In addition to 
comparisons of grants with other innovation levers that incorporate a more 
nuanced view of grants, future studies could examine more closely how 
different levers function together.341 Innovation levers don’t work in a vacuum; 
trade secrets exist before patents, researchers can patent results of both grant-
funded research and private research subsidized through the tax system, prizes 
kick in at the end, and grants can stretch across multiple innovative efforts. 
We should understand how these levers work in concert—or how they 
compete against and distort one another.342 Such scholarship could include 
large-scale quantitative analyses of many actors across the economy, small-
scale examinations of specific innovation contexts,343 or theoretical 
conceptions of how different levers can and should interact.344 The political 
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economy of grants—routinely receiving bipartisan support from Congress, but 
nonetheless vulnerable to political vicissitudes and potentially changing 
funding345—further shapes their place in the innovation policy toolbox and 
deserves closer examination in this literature. Finally, studies of grants as part 
of the innovation policy toolbox should consider the nitty-gritty details of how 
grants work best on the ground, incorporating empirical studies from the 
economics of innovation into the design of research policy.346 Improving grant 
functioning could even involve its own experimentation, changing funding 
mechanisms for just a subset of innovators and evaluating the results.347 Grants 
are a key part of the innovation ecosystem, but they are often not treated that 
way by the literature on innovation law and policy. It is time for that to change. 
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